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You can choose your kiends but the Internal Revenue Code chooses your
family, at least for estate tax purposes. In broad terms, the estate tax
provisions of Chapter 12 of the Internal Revenue Code' impose a tax on any
gratuitous death-time transfer by an individual.' For the most part, precise tax
liability will depend on the amount of the transfer.' Estate tax liability also
may depend on the identity and even the business activities of the transferor,
the transferee and each of their respective "family" members.' Depending on
the particular Code section involved: however, the term "family" has widely
divergent meanings for estate tax purposes? Indeed the federal estate tax laws
employterms like "family" and"re1ated" in ways that conflict with each other
and with lay understandings of the word.7 A uniform definition would make
1. I.R.C. $8 2001-2210.
2. Id. 9 2001(a) ("Atax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of evay decedent
who is a citizen or resident of the United States.").
3. See id. 5 2001(b) (computation ofestate tax).
4. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also infra Pait LB.3 (for purposes of
8 2032A, "qualified use" of property may be by decedent or certain members of decedent's family).
5. The discussion here is limited to three specific esfate tax provisions: $42036(a), 2032A and
6166. There are other tax mles in which the definition of "fami1y"ptays an important role, but they are
beyond the scope of this discussion. See, e.g., I.R.C. 8 2057 (deduction for family-owned business
interests); see also infra note 7.
6. See infra notes 27,39-43,72-77, 125-27 and accompanying text.
7. The estate tax definitions of "Eamily" conflict not only with each other, but with the way the
same term is used in other parts of the C d e , inchding the gift tax-like provisions of Chapter 14 and the
generationskippingtransfer tax rules ofchapter 13. See, e.g., LR.C. $5 2701 (specialvalnationrules in
case of transfers of interests in corporations or partnerships), 2702 (special valuation mles in case of
transfers of intaests in tmst), 2704 (treatment of certain lapsing rights and restrictions); cf id $5 267
(income tax limitation on deductions for losses on transactions behveen related taxpayers), 2651(e) (for
generationskipping transfer taxpurposes, special generation asrignmat mles in the case of persons with
apredeceasedparent),1361(incornetaxdefinitionofScorporation),1563(e)(constructiveownershiprules
for purposes of definition of "controlled group of corporations" and limitation on multiple income tax
benefits). Since the enacment ofthe American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,s 232,
118 Stat. 1418,1434 (codified at LR.C. 5 1361@)(1)(A)), S corporations may have 103 shareholdas (the
limit previously was 75). Forpurposes of the shareholder limit of 5 1361, "family" members are treated
as one shareholder. I.R.C. 9 1361(c)(l)(AXii). "Family" includes all lineal descendants and spouses or
former spouses of all lineal descendants of a common ancesmr not more than six generations from the
youngest shareholder who otherwise would be considered a member of the family. Id.
$ 136l(c)(l)(B)(i)Qi). There hasnot yet been any significant scholarship on the American Jobs Creation
Actof2004 Forpractitioner-orienteddiscussionsoftherecentchangesto $ 136 1, seeMalthewA. Melone,
S Cornoration Rules Liberalized bv the Ameriean Jobs Creation Act of2006 Bus. ENTITIES,
Mar.-Am.
2UU5. at 20, lay \I. Miyssaki. Esro~ePlam~ilingUpdore, in ADVANCEDESTATEPLANNWGT F C H ~ I V U E S
2U05, at I (.ZL1-Anr\CLE.Cuune of Studicr hlaterinl No. SK059.2005); Stefan F Tucker& Bnan S
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the law easier to apply, but it would result in systematic over-taxation or
under-taxation. Instead the statutes should be revised to use unique terms that
apply for limited purposes.
To explore the conflicting estate tax meanings of family, Part I of this
Article examines in detail three complex Code sections.' Part I first examines
$ 2036(a)9 and its rule for the estate tax inclusion of assets over which a
taxpayer-decedent retains benefrtorcontr01.~~
Part Inext examines 5 2032A's
special valuation rule for real estate" before turning to a third Code section,
Masterson. RecenlDevelo~menDAffcclhzRealEsfaeandpass Throuph ~ n t i ~ i &
in,SEVENTH
ANNUAL
REALE~TATETAXFORUMII ( P L I T ~ ~ L & &
fist. Plan. hactice~ourse,kandbook~eries~o.
644,2005).
8. See supra note 5. As a related matter, the discussion of the confliotmx meanings of family in
estatetax law a l k invites largerquestions, bepnd the scope of this Article, abou;theunde&ngp&ose
of wealth transfer taxation. Those who favor the tax believe that estate taxation is a crucial tool of
economicredishibution,needed tobreakup concatrations of inherited wealth: 'lI]fthe diffisionofwealth
is to be preferred to its concentration in the hands of those wim have not prcduced il-end this seems to
be the prevailing trend of public opinion-the inhexitance tax offersa simple expedient forbringing about
452,453 (1913), quoted in R A
that result." Peter V. Ross,lnheritmce Taxation, 19 CASE& COMMENT
MARKBLOOM
ET AL., FEDERAL
TAXATION
OF ESTATES,TRUSTS,
AND GIFTS12 (3d ed. 2003); see also
Andrew Cameeie, IKeslth, 391 N.AM. REV.653.659 (1889) (''By taxingestates heavily at death the State
marks its condemnation of the selfish rniltlonaire's unwo~ihylife."). ~ r ~ o n e noft stho state tax also
describe the tax as the price a citizca pays for a demacratic political system that protects economic and
personal freedoms. B L ~ O M ,$*pa, at7.i-22 rMen who continue hoarding great sums all their Eves, the
use of which foroublic ends would wcsk good
. in the emmunity from which it chiefly came, should be
made to feel that the community, in the form ofthe Statc, rannot thus br drpri\cdof iur sharr.");seealso
W~LLV~~IH.G,~TEF.SR.&CHLC~COLL~VS.WEAL?IJ
WDO~:RCO~IMONWEAI.TII:
WIIY~ ~ I L H I C A S I I O U L D
TAXACCUMULATED
FORTUNES,
at xi (2002) ("Americans who possess p a t wealth have a special
obligation to my
the estate tax believe that it
.
. . back a debt to socieiy."). In contrast, those who oppose
tmproprrly penalrrcs iuccrss and unjustly infringes an personal property nghts
[Tlhcnghttotranrf~~weahhhasthc
poirivcvaluesof tbslcnng inclnl~resinthefonnofrclvardmg
. industry, ingenuity and creat~ity,encoumgingcapifalformtionthmugh savingsand investment,
permiuinacontinuityofongoingentemtise,and suppo@ingdiversityinpriorities.Inaddition,such
h-ansfets are, indeed, ohnjustified by signiticani if not always evident, economic cowtibutions
by those &o receivethem.
Ross, s u p , at 13. The Congressional Budget Office has suggested that 'ye]conomic studies have had
how the estate taxmay influence the behavior of farmers andsmall-business
limited success in identiiling
~.
swncts . . . . A large body ofrescarch has found tha inwmc !axes may dtscounge entrrprencunal r f f ~ v t
. . . [qhe estate tar may also reduce mlreprcnrurial effort." C U N GBUDGET
OFF!% I:FFECIS OF T l l E
FEurn.\l. EsrATtTaxou FAKMSANDSIIALL
BLSINESS~S,
at vui (2005). Eaehofth~seposit~cms
is dr.eply
fvlr b) ordinary ririzens and poli"cimna1ikr. Agaiml this backdrop. Congress cngages in heated debater
over the fuhlreof the esbto &. Joel Havemaan, A Rare Accord: Almost Everyone Dislikes Budget, L.A.
TIMES,July 31,2005, at A-31.
9. I.R.C. $ 2036(a) (inclusion in gross estate the value of transfers with respect to which the
decedmt retained the right to "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to iocome from, the property,
or the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the properiy or the income therefrom.").
10. Id.
11. Id $20326
~
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8 6166, and its rule for a ten-year1' extension of time to pay estate tax if the
requisite percentage of a decedent's estate consists of "family"-owned
business interests andmeets other tests.I3 Undereachofthese sections, family
is defined differently, making mastery and application of the law excessively
challenging.
Part I1 of this Article explores the legislative history of each of
$5 2036(a), 2032A and 6166 in an effort to elucidate the relationship between
the purpose and function of these Code sections and their unique definitions
of "family."" Each Code section operates differently in the estate tax system.
Section 2036(a), for example, functions to determine the scope of the gross
estate, causing estate tax inclusion where a decedent maintains a certain level
of control over transferred property. Section 2032A, in contrast, is a valuation
rule that aims to reduce estate tax and enhance the probability of a family's
retaining ownership of a farm or other business. Finally 8 6166 is an estate
tax payment rule that carefully defines the types of taxpayers who will have
more time to pay taxes.
Part III moves beyond an analysis of the specific Code sections to a
discussion of contemporaryexperiencesof the family. Many modern families
do not resemble the traditional model of two married parents with shared
~hildren.'~
Although the estate tax rules contemplate some family structures
that depart from the traditional model, they do not acknowledge, let alone
accord tax benefits to, the full range of associational relationships that
function in fact as "families."16 This Part critiques the estate tax law's
12. This ten-year extension may be combined with the defeml under 5 6166(a)(3). Under
5 6166(a)(3), "the executor may elect to deferpaying the taxathibutable to a closelyheld business interest

ESTATEAND
GIFTTAXATION
715 (8th ed. 2000).
for up to five years." BORISI. B I ~ E R EAL.,T FEDERAL
Becauseof theovedap in the first year of the ten-year and five-year periods, the cumulative extension may
last up to fourteen years. LR.C. $6166(a)(l)-(3). See generally BlrTKERET AL., supra, at 715.
13. I.R.C. 5 6166(aKI)(atatemay beeligibiefora defenal in thepaymmt ofatatetaxwhere the
value of a "closely held business" exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross atate). See infra note 107 and
accompanyingtext.
14. See hfra Part n.
15. See infro Part III.
16. For example.
- ..Dursuant to the Defense ofMarriaee
- Act. Pub. L No. IM-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) [hereinafter DOMA], signed by President Clinton in 1996, far federal law purposes, "the word
'maniage' means only a legal unirm between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife." 1 U.S.C. 8 7 (2006).
Notwithstanding
state's rules allauinz- same-sex couples to many, then, thecouple seemingly
-a particular
.
..
wouldnot be consideredmanied for federal tax ppuroses. For a superb comprehensivediscussion of tax,
estate planning., and otha Legal
. issues facing same-sex couples, see Derek B. Dom,NavieatinetheSame.
5e.r . / o r n o ~ e l u , ~ d s c a p38e ,S.Y. ST.8 . A . Tn.& EST.S E C T I NEWSLLTIER
U~
16 (2005) For a schoi=rly
dtsrurrion of consi~rutlonalaspcrs of DOMA x r . for example. Deborah A. Bans. Repcat OOMA, 30
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approaches to defining the family and suggests that the Code misunderstands
how families function in fact.
Part IV considers solutions to the conflicting estate tax definitions of
family. This Part first addresses the possible adoption of a uniformdefinition
of family forestate taxp~rposes!~Because each of $8 2036,2032A and6166
intends to accomplish very different results, a single defmition of family
would result in the taxation of too few transactions or too many transactions.
This Part also considers eliminating rules that penalize taxpayers or award
preferences to them based on family relationships, eliminating only the
preferentialprovisions andincreasingthe estatetaxexemption. Increasingthe
estate tax exemption may decrease the number of estates affected by the
complex laws, but does nothingto solve the larger problem. These proposals
are individually and collectively incomplete. Part IV insteadembracesa fifth
proposal to revise the statutes to use terms like Attribution Group, Qualified
Heir Group and Closely Held Business Associates in place of "family" and
"related" persons. These unique terms will minimize complexity, help
achieve statutory integrity and bring the estate tax definitions in line with the
rules' underlying policies.

HUM.RTS.2 (2004);Brett P. Ryan, Love and LelLove: Same-Sex Mnrrioge, Post, Present ondFuture,
and the Const8utionali&ofDOMA,22 U . t5Aw.L. REV. 185 (2000); Mark Strasser,DOMA and the Two
Faces of Federalism, 32 CKaronToN L. REV. 457 (1998); Mark StIasser, The Priw'leges ofNolional
Citizenship: On Saenz. Same-SexCouplasandYreRigktto Travel,52Rw~ansL. REV.553 (2000);Evan
Wolhon & Michael P. Melcher, The Supreme Court's &cision in Romer v. Evans ond Its Implications
/or the Definse of Marriuge Act, I16 QUlNNwlAc L. REV. 217 (1996); Note, Litigaring the Defense of
h4ammageAct:The NexfBottlegroundforSam+Se~Ma~rioge~
I17 H ~ n vL.
. REV.2684 (2004); AnitaY.
Woudenbes Note, GivingDOMASome Credit: The Yclidiily of Applying Defense of Marriage Acts lo
Civil Unions Under the FuN Foish end Credit Clause, 38 VAL.U.L. REV. 1509 (2004).
17. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the same reasoning would tend to suggest tbe
rejection of a uniform dofinition of family for all wealth hansfer tax purposes (i.e., gitt, estate and
generation-skipping taxes).

CONFLICTING MEANINGS OF FAMILY IN ESTATE TAX LAW

20051

7

A. The Scope of the Gross Estate
1. I.R.C. $2036(a)(l) and1.R.C. $ 2036@)(2): Transfers With a Retained
Interest

The basic rule of 8 2036(a)(l) is that a decedent may not avoid estate
taxation if he or she transfers property to another but retains some benefit
from the property. Specifically under 5 2036(a)(1), the value ofa decedent's
gross estate includes the value of "all property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer. . . by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained. ..the possession or enjoyment of, or
the right to the income from, the property."ls A classic example of a retained
interest is a life estate.I9 Thus in the case of a hypothetical taxpayer, X, who
transfers assets to a trust to pay income to X for life, remainder to X's
daughter, all of the assets in the trust will be included inXs gross estate upon
X s death? because X retained the right to income from the property. A
similar but less well-known example of a retained right that will cause estate
tax inclusion under 5 2036(a)(l) is the right (whether direct or indirect) to
vote shares of stock in a "controlled c~rporation."~'For example, where X
18. I.R.C. $2036(a)(l). Thedecedent'sretentionmaybeforlifeor"forany periodnot ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any ooiod which does not in fact end beforehis death." Id. A oeriod
not ascertainable without reference to;L decedent's death exists where the taxpayer retains the hght m
periodic .
payments of income fmm transferred .prnoem,
. . subiect
. to the conditian that the decedent's r i ~ h t
torrcci\e tnmrneterm>naresattheconcluianofthelast fullpcriod~mmediatelypriortodcath. Treas Reg.
$ 20.2036-l(b)(l)G)(as arnrnded in 1960,: see also STEPIIAUIE
J . WIILBANKS,FEDERAL
T A X A T I O N OF
WEALTHTRANSFERS
241-42 (2004).
19. See 1.R.C. 5 2036(a)(I): Treas. Reg.
- 6. 20.2036-l(a) (as amended in 1960). For a thorough
anal pis oft he application of^ 2036(a)to alineofcases involving family limited pannenhips, re? Ronald
H. Jensen. The .Mop,c ofDlsoppeorinp IVeolth Revisired Urinp Funlily Ltmrtrd Pormcr~hiprlo Reduce
Estate and Gift T& 1 PITT. TAX. RE;. 155 (2004).
20. Note that the full value of the trust will be included in the decedent's gross estate even though
her transfer to the trust was complete for gift tax purposes. See I.R.C. $ 2501(a) (imposition of tax on
giRs); Treas. Rep, 5 25.2511-2(b) (m amended in 1999) (gift is complete where donor "has so parted with
dominion and control as to leave inhim no power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or
for the benefit ofanother. .!3. Under 8 2702, the value of the transferor's retained interest is valued at
supra note 18, at 243; RICHA~D
B. STEPHENS
ET AL.,
zero. I.R.C. 5 2702. See generally WILLBANKS,
FEDERAL
ESTATEAND GIFTTAXATION
7 4.08[4][a] (8th ed. 2002).
21. I.R.C. 8 2036(aXl). @)(I). Forotherexamplesdreainedinterests(othathanincome interests)
that can higgerestatetax inclusion undcr$2036(a)(l), seeEsfoteofRapeljev. Comm'r, 73 T.C.82 (1979)
(decedent's retention ofright to reside in home &r transfertofamily members causes estatetax inclusion);
~

..
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transfen stock in a "controlled corporation" to a trust fw the benefit o f X s
son, ifxretains the right (whether outright or in a fiduciary capacity) to vote
those shares, the value of the shares will be included i n X s gross estate upon
X's death?'
The definition of a "controlled corporation" is bound inextricably with
the definition of family. Section 2036(b)(2) defines a controlled corporation
as one in which the decedent "owned (with the application of section 318), or
had the right (either alone or in conjunction with any person)" to vote stock
cartying at Ieast 20% of the aggregate voting power of all stock cla~ses?~
To
illustrate, consider a transfer by anothet hypothetical taxpayer, this time Dora
Ewing, a United States citizen who is married and has two adult children. She
and her ancestors, descendants and collateral relatives are shown in Figure A.
Each person's relationship to the taxpayer is indicated in italics.

Estate ofMmnvell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) (decedent's transfer of home to family members
is not a bona fidc sale for foil and adequate considaation where decedent's rent payments approximate
xnounts doe undcr niongage and past due rea was not collected).
I R C I. 2036taN
.
<slatetax inclur~anapplterif the voting right is held a1 death.
2:.
. . .1.r .. ~. b. ). (.l ) The
In addition, it may apply if the voting right was held within &&years of death. See 1.R.C. $ 2035(a);
STEPHENS
ET AL., Supra note 20,74.08[6][d].
23. I.R.C. 6 2036(b)(2). Ownership is defined forpurposes of 8 2036@)(2)by reference to $ 318.
See in&
notes 26-27 and text accompanying note 31. It is himaterial whether the voting right is
exercisableby the decedent alone or in conjunction with another penon. I.RC. 9 2036@)(2).
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Hvootheticai 1. Assume that DoraEwing owns 20% of Company Y's total outstanding
,tack Company Y has only one class of stock, and 311 shares have the samr vorlng
0 .

nrhts Pursuant to Comanv Y's by-laws and thesppl~cableshareholderagreemnt,any
scareholder may transf2 a<underiying equity int&ist in stock without also transferring
the voting rights associated with the stock. One year before her death, Dora Ewing
transfers to Friend Frank, an unrelated third party not shown in Figure A, theunderlying
equity interest in all of her Company Y stock. At the time of her death, Dora Ewmg
retains the right to vote the shares.

Because Dora Ewing transfers to Friend Frank her underlying equity interest
in the stock, but retains the right to vote the shares, she has at her death the
right to vote at least 20% of the total combined voting power of Company Y
stock. This is true even though she no longer owns the underlying equity.
Therefore, within the meaning of 9 2036@)(2),Company Y is a controlled

10
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p o l . 3:l

corporation with respect to DoraE~ing.2~
Her retained right to vote shares in
a controlled corporation constitutes a right to possession or enjoyment of
transferred property for purposes of 5 2036(a)(1), causing the full value of the
Company Y stock to be included in Dora Eviing's gross estate:'
Note that 5 2036(h)(2)'s definition of a controlled corporation focuses on
the ownership of more persons than just the taxpayer-transferor. This section
invokes the constructive ownership rules of 31826for the determination of
a taxpayer-transferor's ownership. Under 5 318, an individual is deemed to
own any stock that is owned (whether directly or indirectly), by or for "(i) his
spouse (otherthan a spouse who is legally separated from the individual under
a decree of divorce or separate maintenance), and (ii) his children,
grandchildren, and parents.'"' For purposes of 2036(b)(2)'s definition of
controlled corporation,then, examinationmust be made ofthe holdings ofthe
taxpayer-transferor, his or her spouse, children, grandchildren and parents.
Even if the taxpayer personally owns a very small percentage of the stock (or
even none at all), and the corporation initially does not appear to be a
"controlled corporation" with respect to the taxpayer, the attribution to the
taxpayer of the holdings of his or her family members can have unexpected
consequen~es.'~Consider again the family of Dora Ewing.
Hypothetkal2. Assume the same facts as in Hrpothetical 1, except that Dora Ewing
owns 5% ofcompany Y's total outstanding stock. Dora Ewing again transfbrs to Friend
Frank her underlying equity interest in all of her Company Y stock. At the time ofher
death, Dora Ewing retains the right to vote the shares and her father, William Ewing,
owns 95% of the Company Y stock.

At first glance it might appear that Dora Ewing can avoid the application of
5 2036(h)(2) (and therefore 5 2036(a)(l)) because she personally has the right
to vote only five percent of Company Y stock.29 Unfortunately for Dora
Ewing, under the constructive ownership rules of 5 318 she owns her father's
95% interest, making Company Y a controlled corporation with respect to
her.30 Thus as in Hypothetical 1, the full value of the stock transferred to

24. I.R.C. $ 2036@)(2).
25. Id. $203Ma)fl).
26. Id. 2036&(2\.
27. Id. d. 318(a)(l)(A). On gender-neuhaliryinthe Code, see id. 8 7701(oX1)(3)and 1 U.S.C. 5 1
(2006) ("wo~dsimporting the masculine gender include the feminine as well").
28. I.R.C. 6 2036(b)(2).
. .. .
29. Id.
30. Id. The statutory language of $2036@)(2)makes the attribution ~ I eofs $318 applicable only
to adetermination ofownetship levels. tn contrast, the proposed regulations under $2036 suggest that the
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Friend Frank will be included in Dora Ewing's gross estate under
$ 2036(a)(1)."
attribution rules apply to determination of stock ownership and voting rights. Prop. Treas. Reg.
5 20.2036-2(d)(l), 48 Fed. Reg. 35,143 (Aug. 3,1983) ("For purposes of this section, the term 'controlled
corpmation'means acorporationin whichthe deeden$ with theapplication ofthe constructive ownenhip
rules of section 318. is d e e d to own or have a rinht
. to vote stock possessing at least hventy percent of
the tawl combined voting poucr ofall elasses of stock.^. At leas one treatise suggeststhat thisproposed
rermlalion is"draRedtw broadly also in wrmining use ofsection 318a1tributian to determine ~hcponian
of;otingrights. Prop. Reg. 5 26.2036-i(d)(l) should beamended to permit attribution only to dgenninc
ownershirr. not to determinevotinn riphts." STEPHENS ET AL., Supra notc 20,¶4.08 n.97; see also PAUL
R. ~ I C U A N I E L FT AL., FEDEIUL-WEALTH TRANSFER
T A X A T W ~ 247 (5th ed. 2002) ("Prop. Reg.
$20.2036-2(d)(l)(1983) appean to apply the ambution rules of§ 318tothe votingpower as wdl as to
the ownership test, a quest~anabkinterpretation of $ 2036(b)."): MYRON
KOVF& JAMES
KOSAKOW,
I ~ A Y D L I NFEDERAL
G
ESTATE&
GIFTTAXES
2-197 (6th ed. 2004)("[t]heconsl~ctiveownaship rules of
I R S , rj 318 would not be used to attribute retention of voting rights to the decedent"); Steve R. Akero.
Srlecrtuno/Tmsaes: A Dero,ledR~v;ewof Gifl. Errore ond lnmme Tar Eflecrsond Non-TaxEffPro, 38
U. MIAMI&ST. ON EST. PLAN.3-1.3-57 (2004) ('.the mere fact that persons whose ownership of stock
would be attributed to the grantor under Section 318 have the right to vote stock will not be treated as a
retention ofvoting power by thegrantor"); CJNORMAN
H. LANEBLHOWARD
ZARI~SKY,FEDERALINCOME
TAXATION
OF ESTATES
AND TRUSTS
11-23 (3d ed. 2003) (chimingwithout analysis that amibution mles
apply to a determination of voting rights); Susan C. Fmzi, The Fedml Estate Tar, in UNDERSTANDING
ESTATE,
GIFT& GENERATION-SKIPPINO
TRANSFER
TAXES2002, at 95, 117-18 (PLI NY Practice Skills
Course, Handbook Series No. 118,2002) (claiming without analysis that the attribution rules apply to a
determination of voting rights).
The proposed regulations under 2036 are promulgated pursuant to the general interpretative
authority granted to the Treasury Depafinent under 8 7805(a). Although interpretive regulations do not
have the force of law, they nevatheless may begiven substantial deference by an i n t q e t i n g court if the
statute is found to be ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844(1984)(legislativ~regulafionsarevalidunless"arbitra~y, capricious,or manifestly conlrarytothe
statute"); see also Mitchell M. Gans,Deference andtheEndof Tar Practice, 36 REALPROP. PROB.&TR.
J. 731,751 (2002) ("Under Chevron, once acourt finds that a stature is ambiguouq the court is obliged to
defer to any reasonable resolution of the ambiguity embodied in a regulation--provided Congress
contemplated that theagency would haw interpretive authorityand the agency issues its interpregfion in
a f m a t Congress anticipated would be binding on the courts."). Where a stahtte directly addresses a
question, however, a regulation "is not considered such a permissible construction or reasonable
interpretation unles it hamwnizes both with the statutory language and with the astute's origin and
ournose." Waltonv. Comm'r. 115T.C. 589.598
.6.20.2036-2(d)(l),
. .. .
. (2000).
. . In thiscase,Proo.
.
. Treas. Reg.
48 Fed. Reg. 35,143 (Aug. 3,1983), seems to diictly conhadict thestatuteand therefare likely would not
e of the proposed
be considered a oermissible construction of 6 2036. Nevertheless, as the l a w
.a g.
. .
regulations indicates the Service's litigatingposition with respect to the aggregation of voting rights, the
orooosed rermlations
should be taken into account.
31. I.R.C. 5 2036(b)(l)-(2). Forthepurposesofdetenniningwhat isacontrolledcorporationwithin
the meanineof 8 2036(b)(2).reattribution rules mayapplyto
. .. . render anentitya contmlled cornoration-with
re,pect to ;decedent 'ti..$318(a)(5)(A). Section 318 provides not only that an indiiidualis deoned lo
cwnthc stmk hcldby theindiv!dual's spouse.children,grandchildrcn andparents,id. 9 318(a)(l), but also
that stack awned dtrectly or mdirectly by a partnership, estate, trust or corporation may be annbuted to the
Darmsra,bcneficianes or owna;. Id. $
.3 lX(aX2XAHC).
. . . . . . . . In other wads, therearccircum~lnncorin which
H decedent may be deemed to own stock held in rmst for the benefit of a family member. Id.
$5 31 8(a)(2)@), 2036@)(2). To illustrate, consider a variation on Hypothetical 2 above.
~

..

. .

i

~
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2. LR.C. $ 2036(a)(2): Transfers With a Retained Right to Designate
Possession or Enjoyment of Property
Just as 5 2036(a)(1) includes in a decedent's gross estate pmperty with
respect to which the decedent retained certain benefits from the transferred
pro~erty,9~
$2036(a)(2) includes in a decedent's gross estate the value of all
property to the extent that the decedent retains the right to designate the
persons who benefit from the transferred pr~perty.'~Estate tax inclusion
under $ 2036(a)(2) commonly arises in situations in which a transferordecedent retains discretionary authority over assets transferred to a t r ~ s t . 9 ~
There are also situations where a transferor-decedent retains rights to remove
and replace a person (typically a trustee) who has the authority to make
discretionary distributions of assets transferred to a tru~t.9~
Specifically, the

Hypothetical 2%. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 1, mcept &at Dora Ewingowns 5%
ofCompanyY'stotaloutstandingstock. DoraEwingagainbansfers toFriendFrankherunderlying
equityinterest in all of her Company Y stock. Dora Ewingretains the right to vote the shares. At
the time of Dora Ewing's death, 95% of the Company Y stock is held in a trust. Dora Ewing's
father, William Ewing, holds aplesent interest and a vested remainder in the trust. His interest has
an actuariallysomputed value equal to 100% of the tnrst property.
Tnrough application ofthe rettribution rules, Company Y will beconsidered for purposes of $2036@)(2)
to be a controlled corporatioo with resped to Dora Ewing. First, the stock hold in the rmn for William
Ewing's benefit is athihuted toWiilliamEwingunder 5 3 18(a)[2)(B)(). That section provides thatc'[s]tock
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a trust . . shall be considered as owned by its beneficiaries in
proportion totheacmarial intaestof such beneficiaries in such trust." Id. $338(a)(2)@)(i). Second,under
the const~ctiveownership mles of 8 318, she owns her father's 95% interest, making Company Y a
controlled corporation with respect to ha. Id. $8 318(aXI)(A)(ii) (an individual is deemed to own stock
owned directly or indirectly by a parent), 2036@)(2).
32. Scesuprn note l8and acconyanying text.
33. LR.C. $2036(a)(2) (emphasis added). Specifically, 5 2036(a)[2) provides that the decedent
must have retained this interest for life or any period not ascertainable without reference to ?he decedent's
death a any pericd that d o a not end before thedecedent's death. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
34. United States". O'Mallei, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) (findingestate tan inclusion where transferordeccdrnr retainedtbr rightas rrusrcs to p l y or ?x?caurnularctlurt lncornr for abcnsficiary,; OldCol~nyTmsr
Co. \.United States, 423 f 2d 601 tist Clr 197U)lfind~n):erratrtsxinciuslon \rhcrerransfcror-decidmt
of &st income if "desirable in view of changed
retained the right .& tmitee to indrcase
circumstances"). It is irrelevant for purposes of $ 2036(aXZ) *etherthis power is retamed outlight oiin
a fiduciary capacity, whether the pbwer is exercisable Pone or in conjunction with others or whether the
exercise was subject to an uncontrollable contingency that does not occur in fact. Treas. Reg.
5 20.2036-l@)(3) (as amended in 1960); cf: Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 CB. 191 (ruling with respect to a
grantor's reserved power toremoveand replace a trustee that "it is immaterial in what capacity the power
was exercisable by the decedent.").
35. See,e.g..EstateafFarrelv.UnitedStates,553 F,Zd637(Ct. CL 1977) (trust assetsareincluded
is transferor-decedent's 50ss estate under $ 2036(a)(Z) where transferor-decedent retained the right to

.
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Service takes the view that if a transferor-decedent has the power to remove
a trustee and replace the removed trustee with a family member who is
"related or subordinate" to the transferor within the meaning of 8 672(c) (and
to be "related or subordinate,"one must also be "nonadverse"), the trust assets
will be included in the decedent's gross estate.36
Under 8 672(c) a related or subordinate party is one who is both (a)
"nonadverse" and (b) a member of a specific class of individual^.^^ A
nonadverse party is a person who does not have any "substantial beneficial
interest" in a trust that would be adversely affected by the exercise or
nonexercise of a power with respect to that
The specific class of
father, mother, issue, brother or
individuals includes the taxpayer's spo~se,'~

appoint a successor trusteq and neither state law nor the vust i n s w e n t would prohibit trausferor From
appointing herself as trustee); cf: Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300 (1993) ( W t assets are not
included in transfermdecedent's gross estate under 2036(a)(2) wbere transferor-decedentretained the
right to remove a corporatematee and replace it with another independent corponte mtee).
36. Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191. Note, however, that Revenue Ruling 95-58 focuses not on
the initial appointee, but the class of persons from whom the taxpayer-grantor could choose a successor.
On the meaning of nonadverse," see in/ra note 38. Although Revenue Ruling 95-58 citesEstale of Wall,
101 T.C. 300, as support, Estate of Woll makes no reference to the income tax concept of "related or
subordinatd'parties within themeaning of $672(c). Seealso Brieffor the American CollegeofTrust and
Estatecounsel as Amicus Curiae SuppottingPetitioner, Estateof Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300 (1993)
(No. 15311-9 I). That language instead seems to beimpomd fmm another c a s cited in Revwue Ruling
95-58,Estale of Vnkw. Comm'r, 973 FZd 1409 (8thCir. I992). InEstatcofVak, thecourtaddrcssed the
gin tax consequences of a grantor's retained power to remove trustees and replace them withtrustees who
werenot related or subordinateparties within the meaning ofa 672(c). Such a power did not cause the gin
to be incomplete for gin taxpurposes, accanfing to the court. Estate of Yak, 973 F.2d at 1414. Note,
however, that as in Revenue Ruling95-58,Estateof Yakwas concemedespeciakywith theclass ofpcnons
@omwhom the taxoawr-amtor
could choose a successor hustee.
v
Theconcept o f related or subordinateWpartiesis an income taxconcept under $672(c) that has been
-maned to the estate tax laws for oumoses of 6 2036(a)(2).
, .. . For another examole of the ways that income
tax mles have been incorporated into estate tax mles, see, for example, Treas. Reg. $20.2042-I(c)(6) (as
amended in 1979) (decedent treated as owner of stcck held by "any. . trust with lespect to wbich the
decedent was treatedas an owner under subpart E, part I, subchapterJ, chaptw I ofthc Code immediately
prior to his death."). On the validity ofTreasury Regulations generally, see Gans, s u p note 30, at 733
(demanshatingthat in thepast, theIntemal Revenue Sewice hasC'declaredvictory by its own regulation").
37. 1.R.C. 9.672(a).
. , . (b).
..
38. N Techn8cally 3 "non~dverrep a w " is definrd a%someone who is not an adverse pan) Id.
:6??\b, An "sdvrrsz .DL& . rs a oerson who has a "substantial beneficial interest" ~na trusl that would
be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of a power with mpect to that trust. Id. 5 672(a).
Generally speaking, any trust beneficiary will be an adverse party, unless his or her interest is limited to a
particularportion ofthe trust. Treas. Reg. 8 1.672(a)-I@)(as amended in 1960). Note, however, that an
income beneficiary of a tmst may not be "adverse" with respect to a power to be exetcised over trust
p n n c l p ~ l Id. 1672(a)-I(r). A ,ubstantml beneficial imcrzst in a trust is one whose "nlucin relation
ru the rutal $ 3 1oithc
~ ~ .
pro~ezty
s~bjectto th~.~ U U C ~"01B insignificanl.~'Id 4 I 672(3)-)(a).
.
39. Forpurposesofestatetax inclusionunder§ 2036(a)(2), aspouseisMrelated"tothetaxpayeronly
ifliving with the taxpayer. I.R.C. $ 672(c)(l). In contrast, for pulposes of subpart E, part 5 subchapter J,

..

..

.
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sister;40any employee of the taxpayer?' any corporation or employee of a
corporation in which the holdings of a taxpayer (or the particular tmst in
question) "are significant from the viewpoint of voting control";" and
"subordinate" employees of a corporation in which the taxpayer is an
executiveP3
To illustrate this definition of "related," consider the persons shown in
Figure A. Assuming that all of them are nonadverse with respect to Dora
Ewing, those that are "related" toher include her spouse, Roland L u c a ~her
;~
father, William E ~ i n g ; 'her
~ daughter, Nell L u c a ~her
; ~ son,
~ William Lucas;
her granddaughter, Helen Lucas; her grandson, Robert Luca~;"~
and her
brother, James EwingP8 The persons in Figure A who are not "related" to
Dora Ewing within the meaning of 6 672(c) are her grandmother, Sarah
Mannering; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox;
her grandson-in-law, Homer Morrison; Jeremiah Lucas and Ellen Gray, the
parents ofher husband, Roland Lucas; Alsiness White, the second husband of
Ellen Gray; her sister-in-law, Mary Mack; her nephew, John Ewing; and her
nephew's wife, Raymona WeyandP9
As this example illustrates, an individual's classification as "related" (or
not) does not obtain merely &om one's blood relationship (sr lack thereof)
with the taxpayer. Relational status appears to derive in part from generation
assignment and marital stahls as well. For example, for purposes of 5 672(c)
and 5 2036(a)(2), Dora Ewing's father, William Ewing, is "related" to her, but
her grandmother, Sarah Mamering, is not. Dora Ewing's spouse, Roland
Lucas, is "related" to her for purposes of 672(c) only if the spouses are
living together:' but Dora Ewing's daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox, and her

ehaptrr I ofrhoCode (the grantor trust ruler),a grantor tstrcalrd as huld~ngmy intzrzst a r p o ~ e rhcld by
htsor her spouse, unless separated under adecreeof dtvorczor sep*r*lc ~oatntenanceId 6 67?1riO).[?I
40. i d . p 672(c)(2).41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. For purposes of 5 674(c), persons are presumed to be "subservient" to the IaxpayeI unless
shown not to be subservient by aprepon$-ceof
the evidence. Treas. Reg. 5 1.672(c)-1 (as amended in
1960).
44. This assumes that Roland tucas is living with his wife, Dora Ewhg. See I.R.C. $672(c)(l);
see also supra note 39.
43. LR.C. 8 672(c)(2).
46. Id. ((grantor's"issue").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
SO. Id. 5 672(c)(I).
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grandson-in-law, Homer Momson, are not "related" to Dora Ewing, regardless
of whether they cohabitate with their respective spouses (whoare "related" to
DoraEwing)?' Thoseblood relatives inthe immediately precedinggeneration
(e.g., a parent), the same generation (e.g., a sibling) or younger generations
(e.g., a child or grandchild) may be part of the defined class, but those related
by marriage, other than a taxpayer's own spouse, are not.
Note also that the class ofpersons who potentially may be "subordinate"
extends without regard to blood relationship. Section 672(c) includes in the
definition of "subordinate" any employee of the grantor-taxpa~er;'~a
corporation or employee of a corporation "in which the stock holdings of the
grantor are significant from the viewpoint of voting control";53 and any
"subordinate employee of a corporation in which the grantor is an
executi~e.'"~ The actual nature of the grantor-taxpayer's family or
employment relationships has no bearing on "subordinate" classification for
purposes of 5 672(c)." Certain family members and business associates are
presumed to be the alter egos of the taxpayer-grantor, making the class of
individuals described in F( 672(c) quite broad.

B. Valuing the Gross Estate-I.R.C.
Propevty

J2032A 's Special Valuation of Real

1. Generally

While 5 2036(a) is an estate tax inclusion rule, 2032A is an estate tax
valuation rule.16 It is an exception to t6e basic principle that the estate tax
5 I. See id. 8 672(c)(2).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Notc that for purposes of certain grantor t w t rules, negative income a x consequences may
derive Gom a person's being labeled as "related or subordiiate"on1y whenthat person is also 'Subservient
to the grantor in respect of the exercise or nonexerciseofthe powers conferred on him unless such pan is
shown not to be subservient by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. $672(c) (flush language); see id.
$6 67210 (definitions and rules notto result in toreign ownership), 674 (grantortrealed as owner of any
pottion of a rmst over which grantor has power to control beneficial enjoyment), 675 (grantor treated as
owner of any ponion of a t w t over which grantor has certain administrative powers).
56. The Joint Canminee on Taxatiou has orwoseda chanae
- lo the way. that mopem
. . . is valued for
estatetax purposes. STAFFOF
~OINTCOMM.
ON TAXATION,
PUBL'NNO
JPROVE
T A X C O M P L ~ N ~ E A N D R E F O R M T A X3E X9 P6E N( ~
Specifically,
~ ~ ~ ~ EtheCommittee
~
has proposed
that thegift orfftatetaxvalue be determined by referencetothepost-mnsfervalueofthehansferee'sentire
interest in the transfemd asset. Id. at 400. m a t would mean that aminoritv interest discount would not
beavailableincases where the transferee possesses apostaansferconoollingintnestin hansferredentity.

..
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value of a decedent's property is its fair market values7as of the decedent's
date of death?' Specifically 5 2032A provides that "qualified real property""
- -~

- --

- - -

~

~~

~

~~

~

Id. at 401. Instead of setrinathewealthhansfer
taxvalueat "the price at which such property wouldchange
hands between a willing buyei and a willing seller, neiffier being under compulsionto buy or to sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts," Treas. Reg. $8 20.203 I-l(b) (as amended in 19651,
25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992),the proposal would requirean investigationinto the actual recipient.
Akey. as~ectofthe
i s a i m i t e d f o o f s p s a l b u t i o n STAFFOFJOINT
.
.orow,sedaxpregatian~le
.
-- COMM.ONTAXATION,
~ u p r aat, 404. Under the proposed ~ i ethe
, interestsof spouses are aggregated so
that,forexmple, stock owned by a transferor's spouse is deemed to be owned by t h e b a n s f a himselfor
herself Id.
change is the suggestion
of a "look-tbrough" rule to limit the availability of a
A second .~rowosed
.
dtsrount for lack of marknahtlity. Id at 401. Spcctficnily,the proposal pro\~dcsthat in cares w h a t onrthird of chr \due of an ennry's asses srrmarkable, thcn thc wcdth nslrfzr iax value of an) interat 13,
(hat entity will be "(1) the &t value of the entity's marketable assets allwable to that transferred interest
and (2) the value of the hnnsfmor's interest in the entity amibutable to nomarketable assets." I d In other
words,no lack of madtetability discount would be availablewhere one-thildof thcentitfs assets are cash,
bank accounts, money market accounts, commercial paper, bonds, and the like. Id.
The staffofthe Joint Committee explains hat the aggregation rule and the look-through rule intend
to %solve valuation conhoversies in a simpler and more adminislrable way." id. at 2. The rule attempts
to curb "strategic sequmcing of multiple giffs made to the same donee," typically in the %mily conteht.
Id. at 403. Yet the NIW go beyond that and treat husband and wife as oneentity for wealth transfer tax
valuation purposes. Such an approach isconsistent with the system proposed in Bridget J. Crawford, One
Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach toMarringe and Wealth Tmnsfer Taxation, 6 FLA.TAX.Rsv.
757 (2004).
57. Fair marka value is "theprice at which properry would change bands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or lo sell and both having reasonable
knowledgeoftherelevantfacts." Treas. Reg. 5 20.2031-IF) (1965); see Am. Nat'l Bank &Trust v. United
States, 594 F.2d 1l41,IlM n.2 (7thCir. 1979) (.qV]alue is apracticd pracess,always changinginaccord
with the price that it will yield on the market at a given time."). 'While not expressly stated in either the
Codeorreylations, for purposes of valuing real propertyit is generally accepted that a determining offair
market value requires mamination of the price the propetty could command in its 'highest and best use."'
Stahen E. Zumbach et al.. Section 2032ASoecial Use Valuation. 833-2d TAXMGMT.
(BNA),
. .. at A-1
(2d03). "Highest and best& refers to the 'r&nably probable andlegal use ofvacant land or improved
property, which is physically possible, while appropriately mpported, finandallyfeasible, and that result?
in the hi&est value."' Id. (quoting APPRA~SAL
INST.,DICTIONARY
OF ReAL ESTATE
APPRAISAL
(4th ed.
2002)).
58. I.R.C. $ 2031; T m s . Reg. 8 20.2031-1@)(1965);sc~alsoRev. Rul. 74-260,1974-1 CB.275
(detailing mechanics of application of sixth-month rule). A decedent's executor may elect to have tho
propnty valued as of the alternate valuation date, which typically is the six-month annivasary of the
decedent's date of death In order to be elisible to value uroperty
. . . as of the allanate valuation date, a
decedmr's executor must mske the apprnprtate clcction and such<lect!onmust decr:Jsr. botli ihr' value of
the eross csrate and throvcnll etatehx liab~lity.See I RC. 48 2031.1023(~) The Treasuly D~p3nm~nt
rec&tlyissued final regulations under $2032. s ~ ~ T . D
9172;2005-6
.
L R . B . ~ ~Fora
s . generaldiscussion
of alternate valuation, see BlnKER ET AL., Supra note 12, at 236-37; STEPHENS
ET AL., ~ u p m
note 20,
14.03; DAVID
WESTFALL&GE~RGEP.MAIR,ESTAT~PLANN~GLAW
& T A x A T I @ N ~(4thed.
~ . O ~ 2001).
Altanatevaluation can be an efictive mpans of post-mortem tax planning. See, e.g.,JERRY A. KAsNEn,
V o s r - h b n r ~ ! dTAXP I A N U W G(1991); ~onathanG.~lattrnachr&~ r c r i ~ a nI nSindc,hiord Thm Lbte
Hundred Post-Afornm 701 PPlo~nrneElenionr, 66 N.Y. SI B.1. 26. 31 (1994); Rdben A Dawkinr,
Another Bite althe Apple: Using rhe~lternoteVaIuation Election to Restore a Credit Shelter Tmt, 16
~
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may be valued for estate tax purposes at its value for use as a farm for farming
purposes or its use in a trade or business other than the trade or business of
farming.'' In almost all cases, a property's value for farming or trade or
business purposes will be less than the property's fair market value.'' The
estate tax savings resulting from this alternate valuation may be significant6'
To be eligible for specialvaluation rules of 5 2032A, an estate must meet
First, the decedent must have been a citizen or
five threshold req~irements.6~
Second, the real
resident of the United States at the time ofhis or her
property must be located in the United S ~ t e s . 6 ~
Third, the decedent's

FROB. &PROP.28 (2002); Ted D. Englebrwht & Jams M. T~mer,Alfernnte
VnluafionHas Side Efects,

21 EST.PLAN.154 (1994).
59.
LR.C. S" 2032AhYli.
. . -~~
,~
60. Id. § 2032A(a)(I).
61. Estate of Hankins v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 229 (1981) (fair market value typically does
not take into account actual use of property); see also Dennis L Belcher, Esfafe Plonning for Farnib
Busines.9 Owners: Seetion ZO32A Section 6166 and Section 303, in ESTATE
PLANNWG
I N DEPTH449,
465-69 (ALI-ABA CLE, courseof ~ ~ l d iMaterialNo.
es
SH092,2003). Priortomaking the electionunder
2032.4, the executor is not required to show that the real properly had any value other than as a farm or
in a tradeor business. LRS. Announcement 79-143, 197942 1.RB.28.
62. There is a cap of $750,000, adjusted for inflation, on the d e c r k e in value under the special
valuation rules. LR.C. 5 2032A(a)(3). In 2005, the inflation-adjusted amount is $870,000. Rev. Proc.
2004-71,2004-50 LR.B. 970.
To illustrate the tax savings that can result from the application of the special valuation rules of
$2032A, assume unrealistically that a taxpayer dies in 2005 owningonly qualified real property. Assume
that the property's value for use as a $rm for farming purposes is $9.13 million but its fair market a l u e
is $10 million. ~ s s b m that
e the decedent had not made any prior taxable gifts and thereforeretained the
full applicable credit. The estate's tax liability wwld be calculated as follows:

. .

~~

~

Wilh
Application of
5 2032A
Taxable estate
Adjusted taxable gifts
Total
Taxon taxable estate + adiusted
taxable giffs
Lea applicable credit amount
Estate tax due

$9,130,000
0
9,130,000
4,l41,900

Without
Application of
8 2032A
$10,000,000
0
10,000,000
4,550,800

-

In 2005, estate fax is imposed at a maximum rate of47%. In 2006, themaximum rate will be 46%. For
2007,2008 and 2009, the maximum rate will be 45%. tn 2010, there will be no estate tax. lo 201 I, the
maximm bracket will revert to 55%. I.R.C. 5 2001(c)(Z).
63. I.R.C. $2032A(a)(l), @).
64. Id 5 2032A(a)(l)(A).
65. Id 5 2032A@)(l).
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executor afErmatively must elect to have 5 2032A apply to the estate. Fourth,
the executor must file the necessary tax recapture agreementb6 Fifth, the
property must be "qualified real property."67 The definition of family plays
an important role in this fiRh requirement.
"Qualified real property" is defined as real properly that (a) passes from
the decedent to a "qualified heir";68 (b) was being used, as of the decedent's
date of death, for a "qualified use" by the decedent or a "member of the
family" of the decedent;69and (c) together with other real or personal property
being so used, comprises a certain percentage of the adjusted value of the
decedent's gross estate." Each of those requirements will be examined in
detail. They are multifaceted, complex and intertwin& with the statutory
definition of family under 5 2032A.

2. Passing From Decedent to Qualified Heir
As a threshold matter, to be eligible for the special valuation rules of

5 2032A, property must be acquired from or pass from the decedent to his or
her "qualified heir.'"' A qualified heir is defined as a "member of the
decedent's family."72 For purposes of 5 2032% a taxpayerdecedent's
"family" consists of (A) any of the taxpayer's ancestors;" (B) the taxpayer's
spouse;74 (C) any lineal descendant of the ta~payer;~'
(D) a lineal descendant
of the taxpayer's spouse;76(E) any descendant of the taxpayer's parents (i.e.,
a taxpayer's siblings, nieces and nephews, etc.); and (F) the spouse of any
lineal descendant of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any descendant of

66. Id. 5 2032A(a)(lXB), (d)(2). The agremnt provides that tltequalified be11 will be liable for
an additional tax in the event that the property is disposed of or ceases to be used for its "qualified use"
withintenyears ofthe decedent's death. Id. $2032A(c)(5) (liability for lax). Apmpmy's"qualifieduse"
is its use as a faun for farming purposes or use in a mde or business other than the bade or business of
farming. Id. 4 2032A(b)(2).
67. Id. F) 2032A(a).
68. Id. $2032A(c)(7)(C) (definition of eligible qualified heir).
69. Id. $2032A(b)(I).
70. Id 5 2032A(b)(l)(A), (B).
71. Id. $2032A@)(1).
72. Id 5 2032A(e)(2).
73. Id. 5 2032A(e)(Z)(A).
74. Id. 8 2032A(e)(Z)(B).
75. Id, 4 2032A(e)(Z)(C).
76. Id.
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the taxpayer's ~arents.7~To illustrate, consider again the family of
hypothetical taxpayer Dora Ewing.
Hypothetical 3. Assume that DoraEwingdevises Blackacre, real property locared inthe
United States, to any one of the individuals shown in Figure A.

Members of Dora Ewing's family, as defined by 9 2032A(e)(2), include her
ancestors (her grandmother, Sarah Mannering; and her father, William
Ewing);" her spouse (Roland Lucas);" her lineal descendants (her son,
William Lucas; her daughter, Nell Lueas; her grandson, Robert Lucas and her
granddaughter, Helen Lucas);sO her stepson, Roger Lucas; the lineal
descendants of her parents (her parents as well as her brother, James Ewing;
her nephew, John Ewing):' and the spouses of any lineal descendant of Dora
Ewing, of Roland Lucas or of her parents (her daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox; her
grandson-in-law, Homer Morrison; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her sisterin-law, Mary Mack; and her nephew's wife, Raymona W e ~ a n d ) .In~ fact,
~ all
persons shown in Figure A, except for Jeremiah Lucas and Ellen Gray, the
parents of Roland LucasS3and Alsiness White, the second spouse of Ellen
Gray? are "members of the family" of Dora Ewing within the meaning of
8 2032A." Therefore, when Dora Ewing devises Blackacre to any of the
individuals shown in Figure A other than Jeremiah Lucas and Ellen Gray, the
parents of Roland Lucas, or Alsiness White, the second spouse of Ellen Gray,
the property passes to a "qualified heir" within the meaning of $ 2032AS6and
the first requirement of the definition of qualified real property is satisfied.
3. "Qualified Use"

In addition to the requirement that property pass to a qualified heir, the
second prong of the test for "qualified real property" is that on the date of the
decedent's death, the property is being used for a "qualified use" by the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
Ewing.
82.
83.

Id. 5 203ZA(e)(Z)(D).
Id. 5 2032A(e)(2)(A).
Id. 5 2032A(e)(Z)(B).
Id 5 2032A(e)(Z)(C). William Lucas is a lineal descendant of his mother, Dora Ewing.
Id. 5 2032A(e)(2)(C). James Ewing is a lineal descendant of Dora Ewing's father, William

Id 9 2032A(e)(2))0.
Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. 5 2032A(e)(2).
86. Id. § 2032A@)(I), (e)(2).
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decedent or a member of the decedent's family." A qualified use is "use as
a fatin for farming purposes" or "use in a trade or business other than the trade
or business of farming.'"s
Hvoothetieal4. Assume that fourvears before her death, DoraEwins inheritsGreenacre
from her father, William Ewing, dreenacre is real properly locatedln the United States
that is used in a family-owoed business operated by Dora Ewing. At her death, Dora
E~vingbequrathsto her daughter, Nell Lucas, her interest .n thc family-owned business.
Assume tltar Dora Ewine's executor elects to have 6 2032A apply lo the estate and filps
the necessary recapture agreement.
A.

In Hypothetical 4, all the relevant criteria appear to be met?' First, Dora
Ewing is a citizen and resident of the United States.'' Second, Greenacre is
located in the United States. Third, the facts provide that the executor
affirmatively elects to have 8 2032A apply to the estate. Fourth, the executor
files the necessary recapture agreement. Fifth, Greenacre passes to Nell
Lucas, a qualified heir of Dora Ewing:' and it is used in a trade or business,
making it "qualified real property."
4. Percentage Requirements

In order to be eligible for the special valuation rules of $ 2032A, the
property not only must be used in a "qualified" way by the decedent or
members of her "family," but the property also must comprise a certain
percentage of the decedent's gross estate. Specifically, 50% or more of the
adjusted value of the decedent's gross estate must consist of the value ofreal
or personal property which was being used and which was acquired from or
passes from the decedent to a qualified heir ofthe decedentP2 In other words,
at least one-half of the adjusted value of the decedent's gross estate must be
comprised of property eligible for valuation under $ 2032A.

87. Id. 5 2032A@)(1).
88. Id. 4 2032Ah)i2).
.
. Section 2032A goes
. on, however, to provide that use merely on the date of
the dccedent'sdrath is not enough. Id g 2U32A(b)(l)(A)-(C) Additional urc tcrtsmusr bc rattr6c.d N
89 Thiscxamdeassumes, amonzothur facrs,ihat the 50% thresholdof J 2032.4@)(11(.411ndrhv
25% thresholdof 8 2 6 3 2 A ( b ~ 1 are
~ ~b) e t
90. Id. 5 2032A(a)(l)(A). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91. I.R.C. 3 2032A(e)(2)(C) (lineal descendants are ''members of the family'?
92. Id. &2032A(b)(l)(A). The 50% test maybe satisfiedby an aggregate offarmprop- and other
propatyused inatrade orbusiness. Rev. Rul. 85-168, 1985-2 CB.197; Estateof@igav. Comm'r,80
T.C. 484(1983); STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 20,li4.04[31ibl[iil.
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In addition to the 50% threshold, there is a second percentage test. At
least 25% of the adjusted value of the gross estate must consist of property
which, for an aggregate period of five years or more (during the eight-year
period ending on the decedent's date of
(x) was owned by the
decedent or amember of the decedent's family;94(y) was used fora "qualified
use" by the decedent or a member of the decedent's family and (2) with
respect to which there was "material participation" by the decedent or a
member of the decedent's family in the operation of the farm or other
businessY6 In otherwords, the decedent or members of his or her family must
have played a "material" role in the operation of the b~siness.~'

93. I.R.C. $2032A@)(l)@).
94. Id. g 2032A(b)(l)(C)(i).
95. Id.; see Heffleyv. Comm'r, 884 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1989) (in some cicumstauces, cash rental
is not a qualified use); Schuneman v. United States, 783 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1986) (lease for part of
production may constitute qualified use).
Comm'r,774F.2d 1057(1 IthCir. 1985)
96. I.R.C.$2032A@)(l)(C)(ii);seeolsoShermdEstatev.
(passive land rental is not an adive business); Estate ofTruman v. United Scites, 6 CI. Ct. 380 (1984)
(passive land rental isnot an active business); Estate ofAbeR v. Comm'r,83 T.C. 696 (1984) (same); Estate
of Holmes v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 839 (1991) (describing test for whet constihlles " ~ g " ) ;
STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 20,14.04[3][b].
For purposes of 2032A, matetial participation is defined "in a manner similar to the manner used
for purposes of paragraph (1) of section 1402(a) (relating to the net earnings from self-employment)."
I.R.C. 8 2032A(e)(6). Under 5 1402(aX1), material participation has been interpnted to mean actual
involvement by the owner ofproperty. See, e.g.,Treas. Reg. 5 1.1402(a>4(b)(3)(ii)(asamended in 1980)
(in the context of crop production, "[aln arrangement will be treated as contemplating that the owner or
tenant will materially participate in the 'production' of the commodities required to be produced by the
other person under the anmgement ifunder the arrangement it is understood that the hewer or tenant is to
engage to a materialdegree inthephysical workrelated to theproduction ofsuch commoditia.");see also
McNamara v. Comm'r, 236 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2000) (in farm context, taxpayer's bookkeeping, meal
preparation, field work, and machinety operation constitute material patticipation in farming business).
Withrespecttomataialparticipationintheestatetaxcontext,Treas.Reg. 5 20.2032A-3 eqlains that
"[wlhether the required material participation occurs is afactual determinatioq and the types of activities
and financial risks which support such a fmding will vary with the modeofownership ofboth the pmperty
itself and ofany business in which it is used." Treas. Reg. 5 20.2032A-3(a) (as amended in 1981). The
Regulation gives several examples of activities that will not qualify as material participation, including
"[plassively collecting rents, salaries, draws, dividends, or ofher income &om the farm or other business
. . . merely advancing capital and reviewing a cmp plan or otha business proposal and fmancial reports
each season or business ye=." Id. In the legislative history to the provisions of 5 2057, a provision
analoeaus
- to B 2032. the "orincioal
. . factors" in determinine- material pwicioation were described as
'ph)s!cal w o k andpanirlparlun in mnagemsnt decisions." H.R REP.No.IO~-200,
a 399 (1997)(Conf.
R'p ) (ctatement of nlanagcrs). r.er 0150 Erutc afHrffley v. Comm'r, 884 F2d 279 (7th Ca. 1989) (coun
findingthat marerial pnlclpaoon natmct,;Msngels 1 . L'mtcd Swtes. 828 F 2d 1324 (8thClr 1987)(eoun
findtneth~tmarerial ~an$cipariontcst was met); Estate aiShenod, 82 T.C. 523 (1984). r e v i l o n orher
grounk, 774 F.2d 1057 (1 ith Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986) (court finding that material
patticipation test was met).
97. As with the special valuation rules of 5 2032A, the dedoction rulesof 5 2057 provide forthe
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To satisfy the percentage requirements of 4 2032A, the taxpayer himself
or herself need not be the one using the property. Just as 8 2036(b)(2)'s
definitionof controlled corporation imputes asset ownership by certain family
members to a taxpayer, 8 2032A imputes asset we by certain family members
to a taxpayer. Consider again the family of Dora Ewing shown in Figure A.
Hypothetkcal 5. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 4 above, except that at no
time does Dora Ewing participate in the operation of the business. Her brother, James
Ewing, personally operates the business. At her death, Dora Ewing bequeaths to her
daughter, Net1 Lucas, her interest in the family-owned business. Assume that Dora
Ewiug's executor elects to have $ 2032A apply to the estate,and files the necessary
recapture agreement. Greenacre comprises at least 50% of Dora Ewing's gross estate.

The fact in Hypothetical 5 that DoraEwing herself never participates in any
way in the operation of the business does not preclude the application of
8 2032A to her estateP8 As before, all the relevant criteria appear to be met.
First, Dora Ewing is a citizen and resident of the United States.g9 Second,
Greenacre is located in the United States. Third, the facts provide that the
executor affmtively elects to have 8 2032A apply to the estate. Fourth, the
facts provide that the executor files the necessary recapture agreement. Fifth,
Greenacre is "qualified real property" because it passes to Nell Lucas, a
qualified heir of Dora Ewing,looand it is used in a trade or business. The
participation of James Lucas in the family business redounds to the benefit of
Dora Ewing's estate, making the property eligible for the special valuation

annbut~onto the dccedrnl ofowaenhtp and use of the prupeny by members of h>sor her famlly Under
6 2057, aocstatetax deducnonofup zo%675,000is a\atlable vtth respecttoany 'qwltfied iarmly-ounhl
business 1nlerest"oumcd by a &cnt
I.R.C. 8 2057(a)(lI. Because this rule applies only vilth respccr
todecedents dying befwe January 1,2004, h w e , e r , it isnot discussed in detail here For funha analpis
of the dcductiun under 8 2057, see, for example. Manin A.Cialdberg 4 Roben E. Wnek,Esrole Pbnning
lor the Future Reinstolemenr of1.R.C. J2057, 18 QLIINNIPIAL'
PROB.L.J. 128 (2004). D ~ m I.s Belchn.
Plannine
PLANNHGIN DEPTH
403
- * far the Section ZOS7Familv-Owned Businm Deduction, in ESTATE
(,\U-ABACl.E,CourseofS~udieshlatenal No. SH092.2003); Shannon E. O'Brien,Ertote Tax Treorearn!mr
o f FomiAwOwnrd Bunnesses: The E~vlur;on~[Fo'antilv-OwnedBur,nesrr: l 3 e Etolutcon oflnten8al
k v e n u k ~ o d eSection 2057,67 UMKC L. REG.495 (j999). Note that who qualifies as a member of a
particular family is a key threshold determination in the applicability of 8 2057. See Rev. Rul. 81-236,
1981-2C.B. 172(impaaofdivoreeon b i l y relationships). Section 2057(i)(2)incorporatesbyrofemce
the definition of family used in $2032A(e)(2).
98. This example assumw, among other Escts, that the 50% threshold of $2032A@)(I)(A)and the
25% threshold of $ 2032A(b)(lXB) are met
99. I.R.C. 8 2032A(a)(l)(A); see supm note 64 and accompanyingtext.
100. I.R.C. 8 2032A(e)(2)(C) (lineal descendants are "members of the family").
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rule of 5 2032A, because it comprises the requisite percentage of the adjusted
value of Dora Ewing's gross estate.""
The estate tax law takes an expansive view of family-ownedbusinesses
by according benefits to taxpayers who themselves may not be actively
involved in running the business, as long as members of their family are. By
allowing the attribution of the activities (and ownership) of family members
to a taxpayer, the law recognizes that family-owned businesses are different
from other assets. Therefore, the definition of a decedent's "family" plays a
critical role in the interpretation and application of $ 2032A.102

C. Payment of Taxes-1.R.C. $6166'~Extension of T h efor ~ a h e f loft
Estate Taxes
I. Generally
The identity and activities of a taxpayer's family bear on not only what
assets are included in a decedent's gross estate''' and how they are valued,lo4
but also when the calculated taxes must be paid. The general rule is that the
executor must pay estate tax within nine months of the decedent's date of
death.lo5In certain limited instances, however, an executor may elect to pay
the estate tax liability in as many as ten annual installments.lo6 This

.. .

.

101. I.R.C. S 2032A(bUlYA):
. . , .see supra notes 92-96 and amm~anving
. -tekt.
102. Section 2057 is another Code section in which the defmition of family plays an impomt role.
Section 2057 allows an estate tax deduction for certain interests in qualified familv owned busineses, but
is repeated for decedents dying after 2003 and before 2011. I.RC. $ 2057i). Unda the "sunsef'
provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recmciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,.
$ 901(a)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 150 [hereinafIer EGTRRA], the deduction is scheduled to be applicable to
decedents dvios in 2011 and after. Section 2057 incornorates by refemce 6 2032A's definition of
qualified heir RC $9 2057(b)(2)(B).2032A(e)(9) ~ b thcrc
r
reasons, thls An~cledoes not address
d 2057 in detall Note, however. that estatcr that sualtfv for the speclal \alultlon mlcr of 6 2032A often
ieek to qualify also for the deduction under $ i057.- See generally ROBERTM. B E L L ~ ESTATE
I,
FOR FARMS
ANDOTHER
QUALWIED
FAMILY
OWNED
BUSrNESSES (1998). Par a discussion of
PLANNING
planning opportunities for $ 2057 in 201 1 and after, see Goldberg & Wnek, supra note 97.
103. Seegenerally supra Part IA.l, 2.
104. See generally supra Part 18.
105. Section 2001(a) imposes a tax on the trmsferof the taxable estate ofeveq citizenor rcsident
of the United States. 1.R.C. $2001. Under $ 6075(a), the due date is the nine month anniversary of the
decedent's death, unless the Servioe has granted an extension of time to file. See also id. 5 6151(a)
f'DK]hen a rehun of tax is required .the p e r m requiled to make suchrehrm shall, without assessment
or noticeand demand fromthe Secretary,pay such tax tothe internal mvenue officerwith whom therehun
is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time and place fixed for filing the rehun . . . ."I; Treas. Reg.
$20.6075-1 (as amended in 2001) (same).
106. Sccz 1.RC. $ 6166(a)(l)-(3). Fora deseriptioa of lheoverlap between the 10-year extension of

..
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installment option is available under 9 6166 to those estates in which the value
of an "interest in a closely held business" that is included in the decedent's
gross estate exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross estate.Io7At first reading, this
rule seems to be purely arithmetic. However, whether a particular interest is
one in a "closely held business" for 5 6166 purposes is a complex
determination that again depends on the definition of family. Perhaps not
surprisingly at this point in the analysis, 4 6166's definition is different from
each of the previous definitions used in $2036(a) and r) 2032A.10s
For purposes of $ 6166, an "interest" in a closely held business is a
proprietorship interest, a partnership interest or stock in a corporation,lo9as
long as the proprietorship, partnership or corporation is carrying on a trade or
business."' A partnership or corporation is "closely held" for purposes of
8 6166 if either (a) the decedent's gross estate includes 20% or more of the
partnership's total capital interests (in the case of a partnership interest)"' or
the value of the voting stockof the corporation (in the case of ~ t o c k ) "or~ (b)
the partnership or corporation has 45 or fewer partners or shareholders.'13 To
illustrate, consider another hypothetical.
Hypothetical 6. Assume that DoraEwing dies with a gross estate valued for estate tax
purposes at $10,000,000."4 Further assume that the only assets of her estate are

time to pay under 5 6166(a)(l) and the 5-yewdefenal period under 5 6166(a)(3), see supro note 13.
107. LR.C. 5 6166(a)(l j.
108. Id. d. 6616(bj(l)(A)-(C).
109. Id.
110. Id. $6166(b)(I)(Aj. Presmably passim investing as a proprietorship would not qualie as a
tradeorbusiness. See Rev. Rut. 61-55,1961-1 C.B. 713 (ownenhip ofoil andgas royalty intacstsalone
is not a hade or business for purposo of 1R.C. 5 6166): see also Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 CB. 471
("5 6166 was intended to apply only with regard to a business such as a manufacturjng, mercantile, or
service enterprise, as distinguished from management of investment assets."); Rev. Rul. 75-367, 1975-2
C.B. 472 ("[LR.C. $ 61661 was not intended to pmtect continued management of income prcducing
properties . . except where they formed a part of an active enterprise producing business income rather
than income solely fromthe ownership ofproperty."); 1.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 8448-006(Aug. 20,1984)
p a qualify for d. 6166 treatmeat, intaest 'bust bean interest in an active trade or business. The level of
activity is the factor that distinguishes an 'active business' from me mere passive ownership of income
producing assets."). See generally Jonathan E. Gopman & Paul B. McCawley,Estote Tax Paymenband
Liabilities, 832 TAXMGMT.(BNA), at A-7 n.60 (2003) (on active business vs, investment purposes).
I1 I. I.R.C. $ 6166(b)(l)(B)(i).
112. Id. 5 6166(b)(l)(C)(i).
113. Id. $ 6166(b)(l)(B)(ii), (C)(i).
114. Propaty
is valued for estate tax .purposes
at its fair market value as of the decedent'sdate of
.
.
Ilcath,or~sufthealtemau wluauundale, ~fapplicable.Trras Kc@ 4 20.2031-lib, (a? lmcndud in 1965).
Therulcr appltcable to the selecl~unafthe alternate valuarlon dare have brcn changed by fmai regulations
~ssucdon Januvy 4,2005. See T.D. 9172,2005-6 1 R.B.$68 (arnmdmg TTCBS.
Reg $30.2032-I(b),. 'Ihr
rcgularions provide that altrmace \duation is avallableoniy i f ~ u c han elecuun uiil decrease bulh the 9122

.

~
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$6,000,000 in cash and $4,000,000 of stock of Company Y, and that at the time of her
death, Dora Ewing owned 100% of Company Y's outstanding stock.

In order to qualify for the extension of time to pay estate taxunder 9 6166(a),
Dora Ewing's executor must make three showings: first that Dora Ewing
owned an "interest" in Company Y;Il5 second that Company Y is "closely
held" with respect to her;"6 and third that the value of Dora Ewing's interest
in Company Y exceeds 35% of the adjusted gross estate."' All showings are
made here. Dora Ewing owned Company Y stock, and stock is a business
''.~ n t e r e s t . " ~Second,
~~
Company Y is "closely held" because Dora Ewiug
owned more than 20% of Company Y's voting stock (in fact, she owned
loo%), and because Company Y had 45 or fewer shareholders (in fact, Dora
Third, the value ofDora Ewing's interest
Ewing was the sole ~hareholder)."~
in Company Y ($4,000,000) exceeds 35% of her gross estate (in this case it is
40% of her entire gross estate).lZ0Dora Ewing's estate therefore should be
eligible for the extension of time for payment of estate taxunder 5 6166(a).I2'
2. Attribution ~ u l e s

In contrast to the facts of Hypothetical 6 above, consider a scenario in
wbich Dora Ewing's individual ownership does not rise to the requisite level.
Her estate nevertheless may be able to qualify for the extension of time to pay
estate taxes through possible application ofany one of three rules that attribute
others' ownership interests to Dora Ewing. First, stock or partnership
interests held jointly'22or as community property with a survivingspouse will

ofthe gross stateand the sum of the esLlte andgenerationskipping transfer tax liability payable by reason
ofproperty includible in the decedent's gross estate. Treas. Reg. 5 20.2032-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
115. I.R.C. 5 6166(a)(1).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. 5 6166@)(1)(A)-(C).
119. Id. 5 6166(b)(l)(C). It wouldbesufficientforU1ee~ecutortosati~~eitherthe~otingpei~entage
or ihe shareholder test in order for Company Y to qualify as a closely held business with respat to the
decedent.
120. The moss estate is $10,000,000-$6,000.OM) in cash and $4,000,000 in Company Y stock.
121. I.R.C. 5 6166(a)(1).
122. For purposes of 5 6166(b)(Z)(B)(ii), joint ownership includes joint tenancy, tenancy by the
entirety, or tenancy in common. Generally speaking joint tenancy is Tenancy with two or more coowners
who take identical intewts simultaneouslybythesame instrument and with the same riglit ofpossession."
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY1505 (7th ed. 1999). Tenancy by the entirety typically is "a form ofjoint
tenancv. It msembles ioint tenancy in that won the death of either husband or wife the survivor
automahicallyacquires title to the share of the deceased spouse. Like a joint tenancy, also, it is necessary
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be treated as owned by a single ta~payer."~
Second, a shareholder, partner or
beneficiary of a trust is deemed to own proportionately any property owned
directly or indirectly by or for any corporation, partnership or t r u ~ t . ~ ~ W i r d ,
a decedent is deemed to own all partnership interests and stock owned by any
"member" of his or her "family," as defined in 8 267(c)(4)."' In other words,
a decedent is deemed to own all partnership interests and stock owned by his
or her siblings,lz6spouse, ancestors and lineal descendant^!^' As a practical
matter, these three attribution rules mean that for purposes ofthe limitation on
the number ofpartners or shareholders of a closely held business, the decedent
and members of his or her family are treated as one @xpayer.'"
To illustrate the application of the attribution rules, consider the
following hypothetical.
Hypothetical 7. Assutlnt the same facts as in Hypothetical 6 above, except that Dora
Ewing is one of 50 shmeholdns of Company Y. Each shareholder, including Dom

for the creation of a tenancy by the entireties that the husband and wife acquire title by the same deed or
KRATOVIL,
REALESTATE
LAW 198 (6th ed. 1974)). Finally, tenancy
will." Id. at 1506 (quoting ROBERT
in common is "tenancy by hvo armore persons, in equal or unequal undivided shares, each pason having
an equal right to possess the &ole prop* but oo right of swivowhip." Id.
123. I.R.C. 5 6166@)(2)@)(i), (ii).
124. Id. 5 6166@)(2)(C). For purposes of 5 6166(b)(Z)(C), aperson is a"beneficiary"ofarmstonly
to the extent that such person has a "present interest" in the trust. Presumably a "present interest" would
be intemreted to mean a present right to receive income ar principal from the mst. Cf:id. 2503(b)
(nansfersofprermt intcrestr mayqualify for rhcgifi lax annualcxc1usion);Trcas. RQ. 9 25.2503-3(b)(as
amendd in 1983)('An unrestricted right tathe immcdisteuse,pmsersian, orenjoyment ofpropmy or the
income from propmy (such as a lifeestate or term certain) is a present interest in pmp&>).
In the
generation-skippingtransfer tzx contexc a person has an 'Interst" in a tnrst if he or she (i) has a present
right to receive trust income or principal; (ii) is a permissible current recipient ofhust principal or income
and is not described in section 2055(a) (a transfer for public, charitable or religious use); or (iii) a transfer
for public, charitable or religious use if the trust is a charitable remainder annuity mst, a charitable
remainderunitrustora pooled income fund Treas. Reg. 5 26.2612-1(e)(1) (asamended i n 2 0 0 S ) ; c I : T ~ ~ ~ .
CODEANN. 5 67-8-101 (2004) ("Where a donor transfers an unqualified andunrestricted gift to a penon
in trust, such transfer is a gift of a present interest where the hllSt i n s m e n t provides that the beneficiary
has the powa to demand immediate possession and enjoyment of such gift in the calendar year in which
it is given."); Wts. STAT.5 700.03 (2004) ("Interests in property are classified as to the time ofenjoyment
as: (1) [a] plesent interest, which entlles the owner to thepresmt possession or enjoyment of the benefits
of properly; or (2) [a] future interest, which does not entitle the owner to possession or enjoyment of the
benefits of properly until a future time.'?
125. I.R.C. 5 6166@)(2)@).
126. To qualify as a"sibEngVofa taxpayer, such person need have only one parent in common with
the taxpayer. In other words, it is irrelevant whether the sibling is "by the whole or half blood." Id.
5 267(c)(4).
127. Id. The ancestors or siblings of a taxpayer's spouse are not included within the definition of
family for purposes of 5 267(c)(4).
128. Id. 5 6166(b)(Z)(B)-(D).
~

~
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Ewing owns 1.000 shares valued at $4,000 per share ($4,000,000 in a -~ m-a t e ) !The
~~
corpo~ationhas no other votingstock andali stock has the same voting rights. Ofthe49
shareholders other than Dora Ewing, one is her father, William Ewing; one is her
busbend, Roland Lucas; one is her brother, lames Ewing; one is herson, William Lucas;
and one is her daughter. Nell Lucas. The other 44 shareholders are not related to Dora
Ewing in miy way:

On the question of whether Company Y is a closely held corporation with
respect to Dora Ewing, she herself owns only two percent (or 1,000 out of
50,000) of the corporation's voting shares,"' making Company Y not closely
held on that basis alone."' Nevertheless Dora Ewing's interest in Company
Y may qualify as an "interest in a closely held business" if Comp'any Y has 45
or fewer shareholder^.'^' At first glance, this seems impossible because
Hypothetical 7 states that Company Y had 50 shareholders. Recall however,
that under F) 6166@)(2)@), stock held by a decedent-taxpayer "or by any
member of his familywithin the meaning of section 267(c)(4)) shall be treated
as owned by the decedent.""> A taxpayer's "family" is defined in F) 267(c)(4)
as siblings, spouse, ancestors and lineal descendant^."^ Thus Dora Ewing is
deemed to own the shares held by her brother, James Ewing; her husband,
Roland Lucas; her father, William Ewing, her son, William Lucas; and her
daughter, Nell Lucas, all of whom are members of her family for purposes of
8 6166."' Through the application of these attribution rules, Company Y is
deemed to have 45 total shareholders(i.e., Dora Ewing and the 44 individuals
who are not related to her in any. way).
- . Company Y therefore is aclosely held
business with respect to Dora ~ w i - iwithim
~
the meaning of

129. Forpurposes ofthisillustration, assume that no valuationdiscountsareapplicable tothe shares
owned bv Dora Ewinp, or a v other shareholder of Company
. . Y. For a general discussion of valuation
dtscounts in the estate tax c~ntcxt,see 15 JACOBMERTENS
LAW OF FEDFRALIKCOMETAXATION
9 59:14
~ChriainaF. McCann ed., 2005). (vatuat~on
for fedcral estatetax .
purposco):
Wendy C. Grrog. Acluoriol
.
.
Toblrr VersusFocrually BaredErtnte Tox Voluorion. Ilhoco Trust Revistled, 38REn~PnoPPRoa.&Tn.
1. 742 (LUW); lashua S. Rubenstein. Valuol;on. Taration & Plmn;nz Te~.hn;purr
for Soph~s[;cmed
.
Estores: R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ D ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ V A L ~ A ~ ~ N , T ~ ~ A ~ ~ ~ N & P L ~ N ~ N G T E C H N ~
ESTATES
2003. at 7 (PLI Tax Law & Est. Plan. Practice Course, Handbook Smer No. 322,2003).
130. The shares would most likely be included in Dora Ewiag's estate under 5 2033 (pmpexty in
which the decedent had an interest). The attribution mles of 8 6166(b)(2) apply only for purposes of the
dclinilion ofa closely held business interest, not to estate tax inclusion itself. I.R.C. 8 6166(bJ(2)
131. See id 5 6166(bj(I)(C)(i)
stock ownership of a caporation will bea closely held
. . . . . (decedent's
.
business interest forpurpose of $6166(a)(1)ifdecedent's gross&tate includes twenty percent or more of
the value of the voting stock of the corporation).
132. Id. $ 6166(b)(l)(,C)(ii).
133. Id 6166(b)(2)(D).
134. Id. 5 267(c)(4).
135. Id. 9 6166@)(2)(D).
~
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5 6166(b)(1)(C)(ii).'36 That fact, combined with the fact that the value of her
interest in Company Y exceeds 35% percent of her gross estate, means that
Dora Ewing's estate will be eligible for the deferred payment provisions of
§ 6166.13~
D. A Spectrum of Definitions
Each of the Code sections described in this Part defines "family" (or
"related" persons) differently. Putting aside the potential inclusion of
corporations and employees in the definition of "related or subordinate"
' ~ ~ applicable to 5 2036@)(2), the Code sections
parties under 3 6 7 2 ( ~ ) ,made
could be arranged on a definitional spectrum with restrictive and expansive
definitions at opposite ends. At the restrictive end of the spectrum would be
2036's inclusion rule for retained interests in "controlled corporation^."'^^
136. Id.5 6616@)(1)(C)(ii).
137. Id. 5 661qa). Presumably the athibution rules can apply alone or in combination. Consider,
for example, another hypothetical:
Hypothetical7%. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 7, above, exceptthat instead of five
ofDora Ewing's family members holding shares ofcompany Y, each ofthese Gmily members was
the sole owner of a corporation that in turn owned 1,000 shares of Company Y stack.
In this example, Company Y again is not a '%laselyheld bwiness" interest with respect to Dora Ewing
under the percentage ownership test because only hvo pacent(or 1,000 out of 50,000) of the corporation's
voting shares is includd in Dora Ewing's gross estate. See id. 5 6166(b)(l)(C)(I) (decedent's stock
owneshipofacorpomtion willbeaclosely held businessinterestforpurposesof5 6166(a)(l) ifdecedent's
grossestateincludes twenty parentor more ofthe valueofthevotingstockofthecorporation). Theshares
would most likely be included in Dora Ewing's estate under 8 2033 (property in which the decedent had
an interest). Theathibution rules of 5 6166(b)(2) apply only for purposes ofthe definition ofa closely held
business interest, not to estate tax inclusion itself. See id. 5 6166(b)(2). Unda the shareholder test,
however, Company Y will constimte a controlled corporation with respect to Dora Ewing by virtue of a
double application of the attribution rules See id. 5 6166@)(1)(C)(ii), @)(2)@).
To explain, 5 6166(b)(Z)(C) provides that a corporation's holdings will be deemed to be owned
prop onion ate^ by its shareholden. Id. 6166@)(2)(C). Hypothetical 7% provides that each of W~lliam
Ewing, RolandLucas, J a m s Ewing, WilliamLucas, and Nell Lucas is the sole shareholder of a company
that owns 1.000 sharesofComvanvY stock. Forvumoses of 6 6166,then. eachofthoseversons isdeemed
toown i,oooshares directly. id. 66166(b)(z)(cj. Furthemire, indetermining whethkr CompanyY has
45 or fewer shareholden. Dora Ewine
- will be demed to own the shares of Comvanv
. . Y that her father.
spouse, brother, and ch~ldrrnown. See rd. Q 6166(b)(2)(0). Thus,as before. Cumpan) Y will bzdcemed
to have 45 total shareholders (i.e.. Dora Ewine and the44 indxviduals uba are not relat:d to her in any
way). Company Y meets the definition-of a closely held business within the meaning of
5 6166@)(I)(C)(ii), and because the value of Dora Ewing's interest in Company Y exceeds 35% of her
gross estate, her estate should be eligible for the defmed payment provisions of 5 6166. Id. 5 6166(a).
138. Id 5 672(c)(2);see supra notes42-43.
139. Under 5 2036(a)(1), the value of a decedent's gross estate includes the value o f allproperty to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer . by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained.. .the possession or enjoyment of, orfhe rigbt to the income fmm,

. .

20051

CONFLICTING MEANBJGS OF FAMILY IN ESTATE TAX LAW

29

Section 2036(b)(2)'s reference to 5 3 18 attributes to a taxpayer the ownership
the broad end
of his or her spouse, children, grandchildren andparents.""t
of the spectrum (again, ignoring corporations and employees) would be
$ 2032A and its vision of family as including stepchildren and various
relations by marriage.'4' Somewhere in between would be $ 6166'42and
$ 2036(a)(2),143identical in all important respects except for the latter's
inclusion of certain corporations and family members in the definition of
family.
The $ 2036(a)(2) rule, read together with $ 672(c), is unique in that it
moves the definition of "related" persons beyond family relationships defined
by blood or mamage. In that sense, it seems to be a broad-reaching and
comprehensive definition of family, although notably stepchildren and stepgrandchildren, nieces and nephews and spouses of childrenta4are not
otherwise members of the family, absent an additional employment
relation~hip.'~'The reasons for the differences in the definitions of "family"
and "related" persons will be explored in Part 11.

The Code sections described in Part I were adopted at different times and
for different purposes. Section 2036, for example, is a rule of estate tax
inclusion that applies when a decedent maintains too much control over
transferred property.'46 Section 2032A, in contrast, is concerned with the
valuation of property that is already included in the gross estate and aims to
reduce estate tax so that a farm or other business will be more likely to stay

the property." LR.C. 5 2036(a)(l); seesupra note 18 and accompanying text.
140. I.R.C. 4 3 18(aX1); see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying toxt.
141. Undrr 5 2032.\,cenin real propmy may be valued faestate tax purposes nt its value for usz
as a farm for farmmg purpose or irs usc m a trade or busine,, other than the trade or business of famnng
I.R.C. 5 2032~(a)(l);~se~supru
Part LB.1 and accompanying text.
142. Under 6166, an executor may elect to pay estate tax liability in installments. I.RC.
5 6166(ax1)-(3); see supra Pat LC. I.
143. Section 2036(a)(2) includes in a decedent's gross estate the value of aU propem to the extent
that thedecedentretains thorighttodesignatethepmsonswhabenefit from thetransferred property. I.RC.
g 2036(axZ); see supra Part LA.2.
144, Cf:LRC. 2036(a)(Z)(stepchildren and step-grandchild~ti,nieces and nephews and spouses
of children are not defined as members of the family).
145. The differences among the relevant Code sections are sammarized in the Appendix.
146. See infro Pan 1I.A.
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in a fa mil^.'^' Finally 9 6166 applies after the value of a gross estate has been
determined, and provides certain taxpayers with an extension of time to pay
estate taxe~."~
In enacting (andrevising) each of these pmvisions separately
over a period of several years, it does not appear that lawmakers took the
extant sections into account. For that reason, no one definition of family
applies universally for all estate tax purposes.
A. Estate Tar inclusion: Z.R.C. 8 2036

The 1976 enactment of 9 2036(b)L49
seems to have been adirect response
to strategic activityby taxpayers, and in particular, estate planning techniques
that were touted as "the 'ultimate' in estate planning."is0 These techniques
typically were straight-forward transfers of shares to a trust, for example,
without relinquishment of voting rights, which some contemporary
commentators suggested rendered the transfer eligibIe for a gift tax valuation
discount (for the retained voting right) without being later subject to estate
taxation (because the transferor no longer owned the shares)."' In fact,
5 2036(b) frequently is called the "anti-Bymm" pro~ision,"~after the 1972
case in which the government unsuccessfully asserted estate tax inclusion
caused by a taxpayer's retention of voting rights with respect to shares
transferred to a trust.ls3 In enacting 5 2036(b), lawmakers took the view that
voting rights were the essence of stock ownership and explained that,
"[vloting rights are so significant with respect to corporate stock that the

~~

~~

~

~

147. See infro Pan U.B.
148. See i n ! Pan H.C.
149. Tax Reform Act of 1976,Pub. L. No. 94455.90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the 1.RC.).
150. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1 380, at 799 n.3 (1976). The House Report referred to published articles
dcscniingaggressive estafeplanningtechniques: "Onecommentator bas mmsted that '[t]he'kltimate"
in estate planning for most controlling stockholders of closely held corporations is the avoidance of a
Federalestatetax oncorporatevotingsharesthatthey bavemnsfer@ toarmst inwhich they have resewed
the uninterrupted right to continue voting tbe shares."' Id. (quoting Stanley Pressment, Effect of Tar
C0411'kGilmanh i s i o n on &totePlaming for {he Close Corporation, 44 J. TAX'N160 (1976)).
151. Id. ("[Mr. Pre~sment]further suggests that the value ofthe gift might be reduced by the value
amibutable to theretained voting rights, lfthis is dme, thevalueamihulcd to voiingrightawould not be
subject either to gifl t a x at the time of the gift or. .the estate tax upon the death of the donor.").
ET AL., supra note 20,7 4.08[61[d].
152. STEPHENS
153. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972). For ageneral discussion of the Byrum case, see
Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Btamnachr, Smngi: A CriticalAnolyds ondPlo,nningSuggesfions,100
TAXNOTES1153, 1154, 1156-59 (2003); Brant I..Hellwig, Revisithg Bymm, 23 VA. TAXREV.275
(2003); lensen,supra note 19, at 221 n.156.
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retention of voting rights by a donor should be treated as the retention of the
enjoyment of the stock for estate tax purpose^."'^^
Notwithstanding legislators' clear views on the property-like nature of
voting rights, the adopted aggregation rules of 9 2036(b) (made applicable to
the estate tax inclusion rule of 9 2036(a)(l)) do not necessarily accomplish
legislative intent. It is not clear fromthe legislative history, for example, why
Congress chose one set of attribution rules over another for purposes of
5 2036@).'55There is no intuitive reason that an individual's stockownership
should be aggregated with that of his or her spouse, children, grandchildren
and parents, for example, but not with other family members. Indeed
9 2036@)(2)'s attribution rule is internally inconsistent insofar i s Taxpayer
1's ownership is aggregated with the ownership of his or her grandchild,
Taxpayer 2, for purposes of a transfer by Taxpayer 1, but the rule does not
apply in reverse. For purposes of a transfer by Taxpayer 2, his or her
ownership is not aggregated with that of Taxpayer 1, the grandparent. If
voting rights truly were the quintessence of property ownership, one would
expect to see a bilaterally applicable rule. But 8 2036(b)(2) is concerned not
just with ownership but also with control. The unilateral attribution of
Taxpayer 1's stock ownership with Taxpayer 2's is based on the presumption
that a grandparent controls his or her grandchild, but that the grandchild does
not control the presumably wealthier and more powerful grandparent.
Unlike the inclusion rule of 9 2036@) which was enacted by statute, the
inclusion rule of 8 2036(a)(2) is the product of revenue rulings and court
decision^."^ Indeed 8 2036(a)(2) itself containsno prohibition on the removal
of certain trustees by a taxpayer-t~ansferor.'~'Furthmnore, while the estate
tax inclusion rule is rooted in concerns about a grantor attempting to evade
taxation on assets he or she still controls, it is not obvious why the class of
trustees who may be appointed in a removed trustee's place should be defined
by reference to the income tax provisions of 8 672(~)."~The Service just as
easily could have defined the prohibited class by reference to another estate
tax provision. Although the Service's ruling lacks direct legislative authority,

154. H.R. REP.NO.94-1380, at 65 (1976).
155. See I.R.C. 8 318(a)(l)(A).
... . .
156. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C B . 191; see also supra note 36 (discussing Estate of Wall and
E m t e $Yak).
157. See 1.R.C. 8 2036(a)(2).
158. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191.
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any interpreting court should give significant deference to the Treasury
Department's revenue ruling. Is9

B. Estate Tax Valuation: I.R.C. f 2032A
Unlike 5 2036(a)(1) and (2), which are estate tax inclusion rules, 5 2032A
is a valuation provision that is designed to benefit farmers and small business
owners. In enacting 9 2032A in 1976, legislators singled out these
constituents for the favorable valuation rules on the ground that they were
engaged in particularly desirableactivities: "[IJt is inappropriateto value land
on the basis of its potential 'highest and best use" especially since it is
desirable to encourage the continued use of the property for farming and other
small business purpose^."'^" interpreting Ej 2032A, the Tax Court has
identified the legislative intent as concern with estate tax liquidity, explaining
that "[tlhe purpose of the special valuation provision is to lessen the estate tax
burden and to alleviate the liquidity problems faced by the surviving family
of a person who dies owning real property used as a farm or in a closely held
business. The provision is intended to allow the family to continue operating
the farm or other business, rather than being forced to sell the land to pay
estate ta~es."'~'
The definition of family in 5 2032 has not been static since its enactment.
As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the provisions of

159. See Gans, supra note 36, at 777-79 (indicating that the Supreme Court "likely will eventually
clarify that Skidmare is the appropriate framework for analyzing the validity of rulings:' where Skidmore
stands for the proposition that courts will defer to revenue rulings by the Internal Revenue Service where
the agency has undertaken a thorough decision-makingprocess, maintained its position cansistently, a d
employed valid reasoning).
160. H . R . R E ~ . N o . 9 4 - 1 3.. 8 0 . a t 2 1 - 2 2 ( 1 9 7 6 1 : s e e o l s o
No. JCS-33-~~,GENERALEXPLANATLONOFTHETAXREFORMACTOF
1976,at 537 (1976) (Taluationon
the basis of hiehet
- and best use. rather than on amtal use. mav result in the im~ositionof subs fan ti all^
hjghei estatc tzxer. In some cases, the greater elute Ux burden makes conunuation of f a m i n e or the
closely held busincssactivilies.not fastblc bccauscthe income pownttal fromthesesctivines istnsuOicir.nt
to rew~cecxtmdsd uxpaymenls or loans obtatned to pay thc tax.").
161. Stovslv Comm'r. I01 T C 110, 14b(1993), rcealroZumbsch ct al.,rupru note 57, at A.1 (the
special valuation rules "benefitheirs*,
while desirikto continnetheoperation~fafmor~losely
held
business, could otherwise be required to sell such property
pay estate taxes"). In enacting a related
. . to .~
provkio", the deduction for quaiified family owned business interests under $2057, the Senate Finance
Committee explained that "a reduction in estate taxes for qualified family-owned businesses will protect
and preserve hmily f a m and otha family-owned enterprises, and prevent the liquidation of such
enterprises in order to pay estate taxes. The Committee further believes that the protection of family
enterprises will preserve jobs and sbe~pthenthe communities in which such enterprises are located." S.
REP. No. 10533, at 40 (1997).

.
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liq~idity.'~'The ambiguities in 5 2032A's definition of family, then, may be
of practical import to a relatively small number of taxpayers.

C. Estate Tax Payment: I.R.C. f 6166
In 1958, Congress first enacted the extension of time to pay estate taxes
under $ 6166 to provide some relief to estates substantially comprised of
The purpose of this legislation, according
closely held business intere~ts.'~~
to contemporary statements on the Senate floor, was "to prevent the break up
of small businesses once they are established and to prevent their
consolidation into larger businesses. [The ten-year extension of time to pay
taxes] should make it unnecessary to sell a decedent's business in order to
finance his estate."17' Tax relief was viewed as a fulfillment of a bipartisan
agreement "to study and solve the handicaps of new and small b~siness.""~
By placing less tax burden on owners of small businesses, lawmakers
reasoned, the new law would be "profitable to our country because this help
to small business is truly an investment in our economy-strengthening our
communities in peace--improving ow ability to meet the demands of
defense."'72 Historically, small businesses had "not been sharing in the
general prosperity of the country," according a Senate Report on the "Tax
Problems of Small Busine~s.""~Continued ownership of small businesses
thus was articulated as one ofthe preconditions for overall nationalprosperity.

168. David Cay Johnston, Feu Wealthy Farmers Owe Estate Tares, R q o r t Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10,2005, at A-21. The Times repotts that the Congressional Budget Office
hinted that the actual numbr [of farmers lacking liquidity to pay taxes] might be zem. The
[CongressionalBudget Officc] study examined how much incash, stocks and bonds these farmers
let? to pay estate taxes, but the report noted that no data existed on how much life insurance the
farmers had put into mtsts. Virtually all wealthy farmers mlife insurance in mtsts,say estatetax
lawyers who specialize in working with farmers.
Id.
169. See Small Business TaxRevision Act of 1958,Pub. L No. 89-866.6 206.72 Stat. 1606.1681:
rrcalso 104 COUG.RFc. S17087-89 (dailyed. Aug. 12, 1958) (rratemmt of Sen. Kcrr summarillng the
provirions of !he "m,all-business men's tsx.relief bilV [sic]).
170. 104 CONG.REc S17089-90 (daily rd. Aug. 12, 1958) (nalemeot of Sen. Javits).
171. 104 CONG.REC.S2029 (daily ed. Feb. 13. 1958) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
172. Id.
173. S. REP.NO. 85-1237, at 12 (1958). The SonateReport hinted, however, that oneofthemain
benedriofrhc L'utmsrunaf~merapayeswteoxerwould bepsycholo(pca1, notpractiea1,asmall business
ownen wouldcventually hwe lo .
pay !he full estate lax liability ("For those [csratesl ~hichdrdgualify
. . .[for
the extension] it would prove of great help and would also have a psychological impact oo
businessmen-giving a benetit which cannot be measured."). Id. at 12.
~
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As one Senator reasoned, "what is good for small business is good for the
count~y.""~
The link between small business health and national prosperity seems to
have been asserted as an article of faith, without significant macroeconomic
analysis. That a small business might not generate enough income to pay
estate taxes was not viewed as proof of its lack of economic vitality, butrather
as an indication that it deserved special protection. Large corporate
conglomerates were described as an anathema to a system of free enterprise;
In their statements,
small businesses were essentialto the system'ssu~ival.'~~
congressional leaders were careful to emphasize that the proposed extension
of time to pay estate taxes would not necessarily result in the loss of revenue:
"[Tlhe estate tax provision represents a spread forward of tax payments but
does not reduce the amount which will ultimately have to he paid with respect
to any specific e~tate.""~In this way, the extension of time to pay estate taxes
was presented as a revenue-neutral change to the law."'
When refinements were made to 9 6166's extension rules in 1976,17'
lawmakers again emphasized the unique nature of closely held businesses.
They reiterated the importance of the extension, insofar as a closely held
business' loss of one of its main owners might be devastating to a company's
cash flow and "it may take several years before the business can regain
sufficient fmancial strength to generate enough cash to pay taxes."179
174. 104 CoNo. REC. S13775 (daily ed. July 15, 1958) (statement of Sen. Sparkman). Senator
Sparkman lauded small businesses as'7he greatestjob makers. They an great consumers. They an great
producers." Id.
175. 104 CONG. REC. S15793 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1958) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[A]Ithough not
removing any Federal estatetax in those cases, it is hoped that by spreading out the p d o d over which the
estatetax may be paid it will be possible for the estate tax in mmt cases to be paid for out of earnings of
the business, or at least that it wiilpmvide the heirs with the time to obtain h d s to pay the Fede~alestate
tax without upsetting the operating of the business. It is believed that this provision is particularly
important in preventing cowrate mergers and in maintaining the free enterprise system.").
176. Id.
177. Revenue neutrality refers to the concept that "a change or proposed change in the tax system
which results in the same amoUnt of revenue. The concept d m not include neutrality as to each taxpayer
but does imply revenue neutrality as to all taxpayers or the revenue system. A neutral change may rosult
in increased taxes for corporatims and high income individuals, but offset by lower taxes on other
taxDa~etS."
ROBERT SELLERS SMITH.
WEST'STAXLAWDICTIONARY
769 (2004).
..
178. In enacfingchanges to 5 6166 in 1976, theloint Committee on Taxation notes that existing law
was "inadequate to deal with the IiauidiN t)mbIems enoerienccd bv estates in which a substantial uortion
of the assets consist of a closely h i d b&i;less or uhei illiquid ads*. In many cases, the execuior was
fwced to sell a decedent's intereii in a farm or 0th- closeh, held businen in order to Day the estate tax"
STAFF
OF IOINTCOMM. ON TAXATION,
PUBL'N NO. JCS:~~-76,GENERAL
EX PLAN;^^ OF THE TAX
REFORM
ACTOF1976, at 546 (1976).
179. Id.
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Congress also believed that the law needed to be more flexible in granting
extensions of time to pay taxes where estates were comprised of closely held
businesses.1s0Small business owners were a favored class of taxpayers who
were singled out for special treatment.

EI. FAMILY
VALUES:PERSPECTIVES
ON THE FAMILY
The great variety in existing estate tax definitions of the family
underscores the importance of the family to the overall system of wealth
transfer taxation. Indeed estate taxation arose in response to the desire on the
part of wealthy individuals to transfer wealth to their
As people
accumulatedgreatfortunesthat could not be consumedin a single lifetime, the
government sought to tax the transfer of wealth &om one generation to the
next."' In response to early estate tax legislation, taxpayers became creative
in minimizing their tax bills,'s3 and the law in turn became more
complicated.lS4
Apart from taxpayer creativity, one reason for the complexity of current
estate tax rules is the complexity of modem family arrangements themselves.
Family households constitute the majority of American households.1a5

180. "Wlhere a substantial portion of the estateconsists of illiquid assets other than a farm or other
closely held business, it has been excremcly difficult to obtain an extension rm the gmund of 'undue
hardship'because the InternalRovenueSe~icegenerallytakesarestrictiveapproachtowardgrantingsuch
extensions!' H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, at 3384-85 (1976). Fortbermore, obtaining a bond forestate tax
payment requirements had became difficult or expensive for executors. Id. at 3385 ("[Mlany executors
have found it both difficult and expensiw to obtain a bond to satisfy the extended payment requirements.
Therefore, many executors refuse to elect the extended payment provisions because they must remain
penonally liable for tax for the entire length of the extension.").
181. W I U B A N K Snote
, ~ 18,
~ ~at~5 ~(noting also that war played arole in the enactment of an estate
~ E . FEDFRAL
ESTATE
AND GIFTTAXATION
(1942); MAXWEST,THE
tax); see g e n e m l / y R a N ~ o r ~PAUL,
INHERITANCE TAX(1893).
182. As Pmfessor Willbanks explains, “inheritance was viewed as a windfall increasing the ability
to bear the burden of taxation!' WILLBANKS,
supra note 18, at 5.
183. See, e.&, DAVIDRDCKEFELLER,MEMOIRS~~-~~
(2002) (on John D. Rockefeller,Jr:s creation
of significant msts for his family in 1934).
supra note 18, at 5. The first significant
184. Theestate tax was enacted in 1916. See WIUBANKS,
reform of the estate tax occumd with the enactment ofthe Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80.471,62
swt. 110.
185. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
HOUSEHOLDS
AND FAMILIES:
2000, at 2 tbl. 1 (2001), available at
h~://m,census.gav/prod~2~~1~ubs/c2kbr~l-8.pdf.
A family household consiaiof a "householder,"
themrsonin whose namethe housinxunitis owned, being.bought
or rented and"oneormorepeopleliving
tog~ther,whoare related to the housihoidm by birth, marriage or adoption:' with or withoutotherpe~~li
unrelated to the householder. Id. at 2. Families constitute 68.1% of all households. A slim majority
(51.7%) of households are comprired of married taxpayers. The rest are female householders with no
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Approximately 60.7% of all family households include children,lS6but very
few families resemble the traditional model of a working husband and a stayat-home wife.Is7 According to the most recent census data, most women
Many children live with one parent or neither parent, although the
majority (68.7%) of all children live with two parents.lS9 Multigenerational
households (e.g., a grandparent, parent and child all living together) are a
significant percentage of all h o u ~ e h o l d s . all
~ ~persons
~f
over the age of
fifteen years, a large percentage (I 8.5%) are divorced and remarried, but only
27.1% have never ~narried.'~'These statistics point to the great variation in
family composition. In light of the many ways in which American families
differ from the traditional model, complexity in the estate tax law is perhaps

!

husband present (12.2%), male householden with no wife present (4.2%) and two or more unrelated
penons living togefher (6.1%). Approximately one-quarter of all households (25.8%) consist of single
taxpayers
living alone. Id.
. .
186. [.'S CEQSUS
BUR FA^, ILUFRICA'S F A I I I L I E S ALI\
N ~lK<i ARRtUGEUENTS: 2001. at tbl TI
(2001), ovatlohlr or hnp: wwv.crorus guv populalion www sacdernubl-fam cps2004hrml
187 D O N A I . U ~ ~ E R V N DS.CLNSLS
E Z , U BuR~Au,YL.E
T~IR,LUERICANCHII.DREN,
912 fig. 1 (19931,
a,<i~lable
nr http wvw.ccnsus.~ov~psdwepr.oplc
ur-IUpdf; see alrrl JASONF i ~ l u s .U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
CHILDREN'S
LIVING
.A&AN~EMEN& AND CHARACTERISTICS:
MARCH2002, at 9 tbl. 4 (2003),
available at http://m.census.gov/prod/2W3pubsip20-547 ARLENEF. SnLuTER & TERRYA.
LUGAXLA,
U.S. CENSUSBUREAU,CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS,POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS:
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVINGARRANGEMENTS: MARCH1996, at 4 tbl. D (1998), ovoilable at

http:llwww.census.gov/prod~3i98pubs/p20~
188. @NEE E. SPRAGGINS,
U.S. CENSUSBUREAU,
WE THE PEOPLE:WOMENAND MENIN THE

!
l

,
g

!

USI?EDSTATFS,
81 10 fig. Y (2005). otoilable or hnp: w ccnsua.gov prod 2005puhr ccnsi-20.pdi
Ernpla)menf outs id^. the home is somewhat negativrly conr.lsted wxh hs\ing childrm. L' S. Ctusus
RURTAL', .4UfRlC~'sFA\IILIES
AKD 1.1vwG ARR.WGEhlEZ.TS 2003, sl lbi. FGI 12003).d~~al/rrb/r
or
hop: !nw.:msur pov
population
w w w sucdrrnofhi-fan cps2U03 wbFGl-311-lpdf.
. .
.
189. FIEWS,supra note 187, at 9 tbl. 4. As of ~arch;2002,22.8% of all children were living with
only theirmother, 4.6% were living with only their father, and 4.0% were living with no parent. Id.
IJU. lor lhc )car 3U00, lhcrc were 3,929,122 rnult~gencrationalhourrhold,, rrprcsenring3 7%ofall
housuhalds. L' S.Cfh'Sus Bunmu,\tctTIGthEfLhTioh.\L ~ ~ O U S F t I O L D S F O R l i l t U N l T E D ~ T r \ T E S , S T n ~ E s ,
A N D F O K PLKTO
L RlCO 2000 (26OIJ.u v ~ ~ b ~ h l z u r h www
n p census gav populallon W cunZOOO phcr 1 7 h:ml Oi:hoscrnuhi$cncnt~annl hauscholda,65 2'. w i r e r a m p n s d o i s houschaldcr wth a child and
grandchild, 32.8% were comprised of a householder with parent and child, and 2.0% were comprised of
a householder with parenf, child, and mandchild.
Fiverndl~one~ght
hundred thou~and(3.6~~0,ofalI
peopleaged 30 andover I~vinglnhouseholdsrcpon
Ihar rhey wcw lbmnp wilh gr3nd:h~ldren under theagcufcightccn ymrs. 'Fa\ I.\ SllluOVs & JANE LAWIF R
I)YF,GPU\NPI'AREN
IS LIVNG
u I T ~G
I R A ~ D C H I L D 2000
R F N(?OU3),
:
o~otlableurhrtp.1 www.census.gov.
prod 2U03pubs c?kbr-31 pdf JLL~I
undcr hali(42%) reported that they had pnrnary r a p o n s ~ b ~ lfor
~ t ytheir
grandchildren. Id.
191. ROSE M. -EIDER
& TAVIASIMMONS,MARITALSTATUS: 2000 (2003), available nt
http:llwww.census.gov/prod~2003pubs/c2kbr31.pdf.This report does not include any meaningful
information about same-sex couples, as "[ilndividuals who were living together (unmarriedpeople,people
in common-law marriages) reported the marital status which they considered most appropriate." Id. at I.
~

~
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not surprising, given that the estate tax arose in response to family weaith
transfers.19'
Apm from its revenue-generation function, viewed in a larger cultural
context of family relationships, the estate tax rules perform two distinct
first, they acknowledge the personal and economic
functions:
interconnectedness of individuals within families, and second, to a certain
From the
extent, they take into account diversity in family

192. Seesupro notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
193. The family has been a traditional focus of women's long-standing critiques of law and social
policy. See generally Myra Man: Ferree, BeyondSeparote Spheres: Feminism &Family Research, 4 J.
MARRIAGE& FAMtLY 866.84 (1990L Marie WithersOsmond & BanieThome.Feminisl Theoriex The
Social Conshuction of ~ende;,in & R c ~ e o o OF
~ FAMILY
THEORIES
591 (William Doherty et al. eds.,
1993). Nineteenth-cenmw activists. for examole. advocated for women's riaht
that
- to vote on the mound
.
laws relating to the family were inadequate to protect women's interests. See, e.g., Declaration of
SenfirnenS,repdnntPdinlH~~~o~~
SUFFRAGE~O-71
o ~ W o ~ ~ ~ (ElizabethCady Stantonet al. eds., AYER
Co., Publishers 1985) (1848-1861) (siatement of women's right8 activists at SenecaFalh, New York in
1848). Historians twicallv
.. - view the Declaration of Sentiments as the seminal document that
commemorates the beginning of the woman sumage movement. See, e g . , A I L E E N &&ADITOR.
IDFAS 01.
THEWO*IANSUFFRI\GEMOVEML~T
1890-192O.a l(lY65). Onnineteenth-0~nturyn'omen'svotingrights
and other activism. see Ariella R. Dubler, In the Shudow of Aforrioge: Sjngle Women and rhe Lepol
Construrtiooa~theFomilvondtheStoa.I IZYAI.EL.J.1641 (?M)3);RevaBSicgeLShurhePeoplr The
~irieteenthtiendman, ~ e x ~ ~ u Federdism
n l i ~ , a n d I b e ~ a k i lI~I5, HARV. L.&v. 947 (2002). In an
address to the state legislature in 1854. Elizabeth Cady Stahton critiqued the laws of marriage and the
family:
Lookat the positionofwoman as wife. Your laws relating to marriage-founded astheyare on the
old common law of England, a compound of barbarous usages. Women] can get no redress for
wrones
- in her own name in anv court of iustice. She can neither sue nor be sued. . Look at the
position ofwoman as mother. mere is no human love so strong and steadfastas that ofthemother
for her child: vet behold how luthless are vour laws touching
. . The
.this most sacred relation
father may apprentice his child, bind him out to a trade, without the mother's consent--y in
direct opposition to her most earnest enheaties, pray- and tears.
EL~ABETHCADY
STANTON,
ADDRBSS
TO THE LEGISLATUREOF
THE STATEOF NEWYORK,reprinted in 1
HDTORY
OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE,
su~ra,at 595-605. To Stanton, the law rendaed women invisible and
powaless, depriving them oflegal personhood and the ability to care for their childrm.
Most formal obstacles to women's l c ~ aoqualitv
l
were removed in the century following Stanton's
famausstatement. See, r g , Recdv. Rced, 404 US. 71 (1971) (statute mvalid wheremale is preferred as
administrator of an intestate estate): Fmnlicm v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (female milllary
personnelcannot be required@provedependencyof spouse inorder to obtaincertainbenefits, wheremale
personnelarenotrequired to do so). Foministactivistsand scholarsneverthelesshavemntinued to examine
the family as one source of ongoing inequality bclueen men and women. See, e.g, Henna Hill Kay,
&quu/ifyondDi/?P~enrr.The CoseofPreenuncy, I BERKELEY
WOMEN'SL.J.
1 (1985);DorolhyRobm.
~ & u a l m d ~ ~ n i a l ~ o u S e w o 9r kYALE~.L.
,
&FEMINISM
51 (1997);Katha*ne Silbaugh, TurninsLobor
intoLove: Housework and thekw, 91 Nw.U. L.REv. 1 (1996); JanaB. Singer, AlimonyandEflicienc~~
The Gendered Cosfs ond Benej?& ofthe Economic Just$cafion forAlimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2423 (1994).
Sociologist Jessie Bernard famouslydescribed that 'there are two marriages in e v w marital union-his
and hew-and that hi is bencr than hers." Maxine Bara Z ~ M .Femjnhm ond Fomi/v Ludiesjhr o .Vrit,
Century, 571 ANNALS 42.46 (?000)(describing Jersic Remard's classic 1ext.M~FcTunE of hlaRnl~tiE

..
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perspective of certain family law scholarship and gender theory, however, the
estate tax rules are flawed in theoretical and practical terms because they fail
to recognize the full diversity of American households and they valorize
market labor. This Part borrows the lens of gender theory to explore how the
current tax rules embrace progressive constmctions of the family, but do not
go far enough in recognizing the complexity of human household
relationships.

A. Tax Rules and Interconnectedness
Typically women's interests have been said to center on "caretaking and
relationships, particularly with dependents."194Recognitionofthe multiplicity
of human connectednessreinforces values and knowledge that some scholars
suggest are unique to women: an understanding that no person is ever wholly
independent from others!95 To the extent they are concernedespecially with
the identities(andbusinas activities) of a particular transferor, transferee and
his or her respective family members,'96the estate tax rules of $6 2036,2032A
and 6166 are consistent with a jurisprudence of connectedness. That
jurisprudence would suggest that no person is a classically individual rational
actor, and every transfer must be viewed in its larger human wntext.lg7

(1972)). Law pmfwsorMartha Fineman has extended and deepened that critique, exploring the extent to
which the caretaking w o k of familiec is perfanned largev by women, even though they may beengaged
in work outside the home as well. Martha Albertson Fineman, Crackinn the Foundational Mylhs:
btdependence. Autonomy, ondSelfSufleieney. 8 Ah,. U.J.GENllEn SOC. P;L'Y & L. 19-20 (2000j;sce
also Ann Shalleck. FoundotionulM~thrand the Reolir) of'Dependency The Role oj.Uur<age, 8 AM.C.
J GENI)ERSOC.POL'Y
&L. 197,199-20 1 (2000). Professor Fincman argues that by "privalizing" women's
carenking act~vioesin fimilia, the wale has been able to avoid engaging
.. .in that actlMtY iuelt Martha
~ l b e r t s o ~ ~ i n ~ n a n , ~ r n k i n ~ ~ e p e nTire
d e nPolitical
c y : Role ofFamily Rhetoric, 81 v*. L. REV.2181,
2187 (1995).
194. Mary Bccker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards o Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGALF. 21,49.
195. See Robin West, Jurisprudence ond Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). Professor West
explains that
[wlomen are in some sense " c o ~ e ~ t e dto" life and to other human beings during at least four
recurrent and critical material expaiences: the expaience of pregnancy itself; the invasive and
'%onnecting3'experience of heterosexual penehation, which may lead to pregnancy; the monthly
experience of menstruation, which represents the potential for pregoancy; and the post-pregnancy
experience of breast-feeding.
Id, at 2-3.
196. See supra notes 4.97-101 and accompanying text; see also i n f i Part LB.3 (for purposes of
5 2032A, "qualified use" of property may be by decedentor cenain members ofdccedent's family).
197. On the role of the national actor in Law and Economics scholarship, see generally STEVEN
SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OFLAW1 (2004) ("Given the characterierilation of individuals'behavior as
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That women inparticular value human connectedness is suggested by the
work of psychologist Carol Gilligan.I9' In her famous study of gender roles,
Gilligan details the distinct responses of a boy and a girl to the same
hypotheticalinvolving a drug that aprotagonistneeds but cannot afford for his
dying wife.L99The boy tells his interviewer that to "solve" the dilemma, the
girl tells her interviewer
hypotheticalprotagonist should steal the drug.2'"he
that the hypothetical protagonist should reason with the pharmacist and
explain that he needs the medicine for his sick wife.20'Gilligan characterizes
the boy's response as exhibiting a "logic of justice," whereas the girl's
response demonstrates an "ethic of care.'"02 If the logic ofjustice centers on
a single decision-maker's determination of values, theh the ethic of care
appeals to human sympathies and connections in search of an equitable
solution?03 Gilligan's work illustrates just one of many possible ways in

rational, the influences of legal ~ l e on
s behavior can be ascertained. 'his can bedone with definitude in
the world of the models, because all relevant factors about individuals' desires, knowledge, and the
environment will have been made explicit.").
IN A DIEERENTVOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
~ ~ E O R
AND
Y WOMEN'S
198. See CAROLGLLLIGAN,
VOICE];klAPPiNG THE MORALD o M ~ : A
DEVELOPMENT (1982) lhereina%er IN A DIFFERENT
COYTRlBtJ ClOX OF WOUFN'~
T H I N K NTO
G pSyCHOLotiiC~1.?NEORY *l*DEDUC.41 :<I%(CCO~
GIIIIP~D
Ct
ti. eda., 1988~;reeuisoMARY
F < E L O B € L ~E+I K
A LY. WD.\~PEI'S
W A ~01
S KVD\VIUG,1986). tiiiligan'\
work has been criticized as difficult to test empirically. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Walker. Sexism in
Xoir/berab Moral Psycholopy?.
AN INTRODUCTION
83-107 (W~lliamM.
- in MORALDEVELOPMENT:
Kunlnes& Jacob L G,uim.eds.. 1995). For an ovcMew ofcntiral rcrponirs la Glli~gan'swork. .re Sard
IdfTec 8: )me[ Sbtblq Hydc, (icttder Di)firarces in .Word Oriennrlo~z A . ! ( e / d - : f ! t d / ) ~ lI26
~ , Ps?CliOl..
BULL703 (20001, Slaurcen Rose Ford & Carol Ruoer i a w e r ) , G ~ n d e ~ i ) ) f i r e n tn
r n.\l,,rulReordnr,8g:
A Connporison ol'rhr Use o(Jurtcc ond Core 0?tr~tttot;onr,50 J PC~s~irnl.IrY
& Soc P l r i ~ o l .777
(1986):
199. INA DIFFERENT
VOICE,supra note 198, at 25-29.
200. Id. at 26.
201. Id. at27-28.
202. Id. at29-30. The"ethicof care" has beencritiquedasreinfo1~ingtr8ditionalgendwstereo~pes.
S~~,~.~,KATHARINET.BAR~ETTETAL.,GENDERANDLAW:
THEORYDOCT~INEANDCOMMENTARY
813
(3d edr2002). Law professor Kathryn Abrams has suggested that women's assumption of nurturing roles
failwe to accommodate workers who are also parwts, or spouses' failure to
is a response "to employers'
. .
snare thc darncstie m k s that 611 d~spropon~onately
to mothers uho continue lu %ark " K3tb1y1 Abrxrnr.
5'o:oe,a/Coni!rucnon.RovtngB~olog~sm
ondReasonoble nbmm, 41 DEPALIL KE\ IOZ1.1026 (1992)
in contrast, law professor Richard Epstein suggests purely biological bases for women's behavior:
Thenurmring instincts usuallyamibutable towomenarea set ofaniNdina1adaptations that reduce
the cost ofdoingactivitieies that help promote the survival of both her and her offspring. Although
modem women operate in settings far different from those of their ancient mother, the initial
tendency stiU remains: If n m r i n g brings greaterpleasuie or requires lower costs for women than
far men, thm we should expect ro see womm devote a greater percentage ofthcirresaurces to it
than men.
L. REV. 981,990 (1992).
Richard A. Epstein, Gender $for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL
203. For a generaldiscussion of theimpact ofGilligan's workonlegal reasoning,seeCameMenkcl-
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which men and women may be different, but suggests that women place a
This provides a context for
particular premium on human relation~hips.2~~
evaluating the estate tax's emphasis on family relationships and suggests the
way that the estate tax embraces the jurisprudence of connectedness.
The estate tax law's preferences (andpenalties) for families acknowledge
the human dimension of wealth transfers, particularly that the economic
realities of any one transfer may depend on the identity of either the donee of
an inter vivos gift or the legatee of a death-time transfer.20s Transfers to
family members are treated in some instances more favorably than transfers
to strangers,206but replacement of a removed trustee is fraught ,with greater
potential estate tax penalties when the replacement is a family member instead
of a ~tranger.2~' The estate tax rules' embrace of a jurisprudence of
connectedness is not complete, however. The rules do not fully account for
the multi-dimensional aspects of human relations. The existence of family
hostility, for example, is irrelevant to the determination of whether a
corporation is "controlled" for purposes of 9 2036(a)(l)'s estate tax inclusion
rule.20sThe definition in 9 2036(h)(2) focuses on the holdings of the taxpayer
and family members without regard to the qualitative nature of the
interpersonal relationships (i.e., whether a person is in fact "controlled" by
another). Similarly whether a particular family member-trustee is in fact
"subordinate" with respect to the taxpayer-transferoris irrelevant for purposes
of 5 2036(a)(2)'s inclusion
The only relevant criterion is whether the
trustee is a member of the prohibited class. So the tax laws recognize
interconnectednessto a certain extent, but efficient application of the tax rules
requires the overlay of bright line rules that may or may not reflect the
realities of particular family relationships. The estate tax rules recognize
some, but not all, connectedness between individuals.

Meadow, Portia in o D i f e ~ e n tVoice, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 39.43-49 (1985).
204. Although a thorough discussion of the nahlre of genda differences is beyond the scope of this
article, for an overview of the ways that gender theories are applied to iurkprudence, see MARTHA
CHAMALLAS,
INTRODUCTION
TO
GOAL
THEORY
15-22 ?id ed. 2003). 205. See discussion supra Parts LA-C.
206. E g . , 1.RC. 5 2032A(b) (qualified real property must have been used for a qualifying use by a
member of a decedent's family).
207. E . g , id. 5 2036(a)(2).
208. See id. 5 2036(aXI);see also Lawrence Stern,ALfribution Rules'E&t on SfoekRcdemptions
when FarniLvHostilily Exisa, 38 Sw. L.J. 887 (1984).
209. E . g , I.R.C. 5 2036(a)(2).
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B. Tar Rules and Diversit)?in Families
1. How the Definitions Succeed

Family law scholarship draws attention to the diversity in American
families. That diversity requires the estate tax definitions of "family" or
"related" persons to embrace modem .family configurations to some extent.
For example, perhaps in a nod to the prevalence of divorce, 8 2036(b)(2),
which is applicable to $2036(a)(1), provides that the holdings of a taxpayertransferor's spouse will not be aggregated with the taxpayer's if the spouses
are separated under a decree of divorce or separate 'maintenance?" In
possible acknowledgment of multigenerational families (and the likelihood
that an adult may be taking care of elderfy parents as well as minor children),
a parent is a "related or subordinate" party for purposes of 8 2036(a)(2), and
therefore cannot be removed or replaced as a trustee of a trust created by the
taxpayer?" Similarly, siblings are defined as members of the "family" for
purposes of $$2032A and 6166;" recognizing the role of extended family in
closely held or family-owned businesses. Given the irregular nature of the
American family, these expansive definitions of families are appropriate.

2. How the Definitions Fail
At least in the popular imagination, the term "family" calls up an image
of a grouping of persons related by blood or marriage. The stereotypical
family is organized around a heterosexual mamed couple and their
descendants?13 The estate tax rules are oriented toward this vision of the
nuclear family, allowing for some variations within a traditional bandwidth.
Yet the multiple estate tax definitions of family do not recognize the same
variations on the traditional structure. For example, 5 2032A is the only one
of the four provisions to includewithin the definitionof family" stepchildren
and spouses of lineal descendants of the transferor or the transferor's
spouse?I4 Likewise, $ 2036(b)(2)'s defmition of a controlled corporation is
210. Id. d.$2036(aXI), @)(2), 318(a)(l).
211. Rev. Rul. 95.58. 1995-2 C.B. 1:see LR.C. PF,
This example assumes that
..2036(a)(2),672(c).
....
the parent is not a nonadverse party with respect to the taxpayer-transferor. I.R.C. 5 2036(a)(2).
212. I.R.C. $5 2032A(e)(Z)(D), 6166@)(2)(D),267(c)14).
213. Consider, for example, that all persons shown in Figure A likely would be considered members
of Dora Ewing's extended 'Yamily" as the term is used popularly.
214. 1.R.C. 5 2032A(e)(2XD); cf: id. $5 2036(aX1), @)(2), 318(a)(lXA), 2036(a)(2), 672(c),
6166@)(2)(D). For purposes of 5 2036(a), the failure to include stepchild~n,as an example, within the
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the only one ofthe four subject Code sections not to include siblings.2" In the
case of 2036, this seems to be an explicit policy choice in light of the
section's concern with control.2t6 Whatever the reasons, though, the
definitions are inconsistent in their recognition of the diversity of families.
The inconsistency of the estate tax's definitions of family is matched by
their underinclusivity. Existing estate tax defmitions recognize traditional
families, stepfamilies and extended families, but they do not recognize
nonmarital associational relationships that some people consider to be
"family." The estate tax maintains this approach even in the face of state laws
that grant some of those "families" limited legal recognition. For example,
under New Jersey's Domestic Partnership Act:" opposite sex partners who
are both sixty-two years of age or older and same sex partners (who are not
permitted to many under New Jersey law) may register as domestic
partners.2Is Registration of the domestic partnership is meant to afford

definition of family can be read as a pro-taxpayer rule. For example, a stqrchild*~
holdings will not be
aggregated with the taxpayer-tnutsferor's for purposes of the definition of a controlled corporation under
$2036(a)(l). Seesupra notes21-25 and accompanyingtext. Likewise, tothe extent thatthe descendants
ofa taxpayer'sspouseare not "relater to the taxpayer, thetaxpayerpresumablycouldremove and replace
a stepchild-mstee without negative tax consequences. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying texf.
Consider, however, that for purposes of 8 6166, the failure to include stepchildren within the definitionof
"family" acts to the dettimenl of tho taxpayer. A stepchild's hold'is will not be aggregated with the
decedent's f a purposes ofthe 45-person ownership cap. See I.R.C. 8 6166@)(1)(B)(ii).
215. See I.R.C. 8 2036@)(2). As with stepchikiren, the failure to include s i b l i n ~within the
definition offamilycan be readas apro-taxpayer rule. Seesupra notes21-25,214 and accompanyingtext.
216. Thesectimperhapreflectsthcbeliefthat in thecontextofa fdmilybusiness, siblings, byvirme
of natural rivalry or divagent financial needs, are not likely to control m e another. 1am gmeful to
Professor Ronaki H.Jensen f a this insight.
217. N.J. STAT.ANN.g 2638A-1 (West 2005).
2 18. A domesic partner is defined as "a p r s m who is in a relationship that satisfies the definition
of a domestic pamership," where domestic partnership is defined as a "fdmilial relationship" in which
individuals "choose[] to live together in i m p o m pe~sonal,emotional and mnomic wmmined
relationships with another individual:' Id. 5 2638A-3. The requiremenu of a domestic partnership ~IC:
(1
for each other's
. .)Both oersonshaveacommonresidenceand are otherwise iointlv
-resvonsible
.
common welfdreasevidencedbyjoint financialarrangementsorjoint ownershipofreal orpemnal
oronem.
" . which shall be demonstrated bv at least one of the follow in^:
(a) a joint deed, mortgage apemen1 or lease;
(b)
joint bank acwunt:
. . a.
(c) designation of one of the pasons as a primary beneficiary in the other person's will;
(dt desimation
ofoneof t h e m m s as a orimarvbeneficiar~inthe other person's life
.
insurance policy or retirement plan; or
(e) joint ownership of a motor vehicle;
(2)Both personsagree to bejointly responsible for each other's basic living expensesduringthe
domestic partnership;
(3) Neither person is in a marriage recognized by New Jersey law or a member of another
domestic parhership;

.

44

PI'JTSBURGH TAX REVIEW

p o l . 3:1

domestic partners certain legal benefits under state law.'I9 Yet for federal
estate tax purposes, these persons are not considered members of the same
''family"220in the several ways that the statutes define that term. Consider, for
example, a variation on Hypothetical 2.221

(4) Neither person is related to the other by blood or affinity up to and including the fourth
d e-m e of consanrminiw;
- .
(5) Both persons are of the same sex and therefore unable to enter into a marriage with each
other that is recomized
- by New Jersey law, except that two persons who are each 62 years of age
or older andnot ofthe same sexmay establish a domstic partnership ifthey meet therequiiements
set foah in this section;
(6) Both persons have chosen to share each other's lives in a committed relationship of mutual
caring;
(7) Both,persons are at least 18 years of age;
(8) Both persons filejointly an Affidavit of Domestic Pametship; and
(9) Neither person has been a partner in a domestic pamiership that was terminated less than
180 days prior to the filing of the current Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, except that this
prohibition shallnot apply if one ofthe partnersdied; and, inall cases in which a person registered
a prior domestic parinership, the domestic partnership shall have been terminated in accoldance
with the provisions of section 10 of P.L. 2003, c. 246 (C.26:8A-10).
Id. 5 2638A-4.
219. The law is meant to provide, among other things, for pmtection against discrimination in
housing, eligibility for covemge of state employees' domestic partners under certain state-administered
benefit program, hospital visitation rights, and otha health beneflts to those who register as domestic
pamen. Id. 6 2638A-2. For an averview New Jersey's Domestic Pamienhip Act, see Thomas Pro1 &
Danirl Weiss,I.i@tngo Lomp: 12'iIl N m Jnsq Crrore a S h / Itarbor for ( i q u n d Lr,biur Imn<iporton
Ri.qkts7.227 N I. LA* 22 (2004); FeliceT. I.<nda,The Pmddt.m o/Son~r-SexhldrriagcRightr. I3 N J.
LAW. WKLY.NEWSPAPER
1759 (2004).
220. BecauseDOMAprovides that forfederalpqoses,mmiageis definedasalegal union between
s man and a woman, I U.S.C. 7 (2006), a New Jersey domestic partnership likely would not be
recognized for federal estate tax purposes. See also CAL. FAM.CODE$9 297-299.6 (West 2005)
(California's domestic partnership law).
221. For consistencyin illustration, Hypothetical 8 envisions DomEwing's acquiring an unmam'ed
opposite-sex partner. The same results would obtain with a same-sex par!ner, regardless of whether Dora
Ewingand the partnerweremarried,parties to a civilunionorregistereddcmesticpartners. Seesupra note
16.
Ifsame-sex marriage were to be recognized for federal tax purposes, the provisions of $8 2036(a)(l),
2036(a)(2), 2032A and 6166, among othas, probably would not need to be revised significantly in order
to accommodatethis newtype of family arrangement Seesupra note 16. This assumes that a taxpayer's
o
s Ifthis werenotthecase,
e
same-sex partner would be defined for federal ~
thestatutes would need to berwisedso that thesamesexpainer is brought within the definition offamily
member. If same-sen marriage remains unrecognized for kieml tax purposs, though, study of the
conflicting meanings offamily in the estate taxlaw at least invitesreconsiderationofthe issue. In claiming
the right to marry, same-sex couples knowingly invoke all ofthose benefits and burdens of the taxsystem.
See supra note 16. Same-sex marriage activists evidence awareness of the dual beneficial-burdensome
nahw ofthe estate laxsystem in advising taxpayers against selective self-application of the taxmles. See
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and DeTenders, Nnvigating Income T m e s f o r Mam'ed Same-Se+ Couples,
w~w.glad.or~rightsltaxe~~for~married~~oupIe~~h~
(same-sex mmied couples should be consistent in
their approach to tax rules "to prevent others from using the designation 'single' to argue or prove that a
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Hypothetical 8. Assume that D o n Ewingsurvives her husband, Roland Lucas, and later
enters into a long-tcrmcommittcdrelationshipwith Mr. Z (not shown in Figure A). Dora
Ewing and .Mr. 2 live together in a marital-like relationship, but they are not married.
When they arc both residents of the State of New Jersey and over the aee of sixty-twu
years, they register their domestic partnership with &e applicable st& autho"ties.
Further assume that Dora Ewing owns 5% of Company Y's total outstanding stock.
Company Y has only one class of stock, and all shares have the same voting rights.
Pursuant to Company Y's hy-laws and the applicable shareholder agreement, any
shareholder may transsr an underlying equity interest in any stock without also
t r a n s f d g the voting rights associated with the stock. One year before her death, Dora
Ewing transfers to Friend Frank, an unrelated third party (not shown in Figure A), the
underlying equity interest in all of her Compauy Y stock. At the time of Dora Ewing's
death, Dora Ewing retained her voting rights and Mr. Z owns 95% of the Compauy Y
stock. At the time of her death, Dora Ewing and Mr. Z had lived together for over 25
years.

In this case, Dora Ewing's estate can avoid entirely the application of
$ 2036(b)(2) because she personally has the right to vote only five percent of
Company Y
Mr. Z's 95% ownership is not attributed to her under
$318 and $ 2036(b)(2), even though Dora Ewing and Mr. Z lived together in
a domestic partnership recognized by state law, and the fact that his ownership
would be attributed to her if they had been mamed.223Unlike in Hypothetical
1 and Hypothetical 2, the full value of the stock transferred to Friend Frank
therefore escapes inclusion in Dora Ewing's gross estate under
$ 2036(b)(l):24 notwithstanding her long-term, family-like relationship with
Mr. Z, the Company's majority owner. To facilitate application of the law,
the Code employs a bright line test for determining who is a member of the
family.z25The Code does not look on a case-bycase basis at each taxpayer's
transfer.

person is not really married when that issue arises in other legal contexts:');see olso Dom,supra note 16,
at 23 (suggestingthat married same-sex couplesshauld "act as though Ihey werebound by Code provisions
limiting intrafanily wealth transfers. Opting into such requirements would also avoid the need for
'emergencyplanning' ifDOMA were to beovertmedorrepealedandsame-sex maniages wereto become
recogpized for Federal tax purposes.").
222. See supra note 221.
223. See supra note 221. Contrast this with the resuh in Hypothetical 2 where Dora Ewing's
ownership was aggregated with her father's.
224. I.R.C. $2036(b)(l), (2).
225. The bright-line test in some sensemay bea function of evidentiaryconcm. That is, toavoid
undertaking a case-by-case analysis of all of a decedent's transfers, the law establishes a rnle for who is a
member of the decedent's "family." Who is "family" is determined by legal relationships that can be
determined with catainty, as birth, death and maniage records are for the most pad documented by the
state, making it easy to prove thme relationships.
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In Hypothetical 8, the federal estate tax law's failure to recognize the
state domestic partnership enables a taxpayer to escape taxation on a
transaction that substantivelyresembles one that istaxedundercurrent law.*16
But there are situations in which the law's failure to recognize nonmarital
families will render the taxpayer ineligible for certain tax benefits. Consider,
for example, this variation on Hypothetical 7.

-

Hwothetical
9. Assume as in Hwothetical
7 that Dora Ewinz survives her husband.
..
..
Roland Lucas, and later enten into a long-term committed relationship with Mr. Z (not
shoum in F i m Al. Dora Ewine and Mr. Z live together in a marital-lke relsionshi~.
but they arenot married. whenlthey are both residents of the State of New Jersey and
over the age of 62. thev
. reeister their domestic oartnershi~with the ao~licablestate
authorities. ~ u r t h k rassume that four years bekre her death, Dora g win^ inherits
Greenacre from her father, William Ewing. Greenacre is real orooertv located in the
United States that is used k a family-owngd business operated ky DO& Ewing. At her
death, Dora Ewinp:
-besueaths
. Greenacre to her lonz-time com~anion.Mr. 2. Assume
that Dora Ewing's executor elects to have 8 2 0 3 2 ~
apply ti the e s k e and files the
necessiny recapture agreement.

-

In Hypothetical 9, Dora Ewing's estate will not be eligible for the application
of the special valuation rules of Cj 2032A because it does not meet the
threshold requirement^,].^^ even though her executor elects to have 5 2032A
apply to the estate and files the necessary recapture agreement.22sAlthough
Dora Ewing is a citizen and resident of the United States,].19and Greenacre is
located in the United States, Mr. Z is not a "qualified heir" of Dora Ewing
because he is not her h~sband.~"' Greenacre thus is not "qualified real
property" and the special valuation rules will not apply.231
Just as Dora Ewing's nonmarital relationship means that favorable estate
tax valuation rules were unavailable under Cj 2032.4, a similar unavailability
of tax benefits occurs under 8 6166.
Hypothetical 10. Assume that Dora Ewing dies with a gross estate valued for estate tax
at S10,000.000. Further assumethu the onlvassetsoftheestateare$6.000.000
.ournoses
.
In cash andS4,OU0,000 of stock of Company Y. Asiume that Dora Ewing is one of 50
shareholders of Cumuany Y. Each shareholder, including Dora Ewinr, owns 1.000
shares valued at $4,060 pet share ($4,000,000 in aggregatep The c o G t i o n has no

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Spe supra Hypothetical 2.
See supra notes 63-67 and aacompanying ten.
See LR.C. 5 2032A(a)(l)(A).

Id. 3 2032A(a)(lXA); seesupra note 64and accompanyingtext.
LR.C. 5 2032A(e)(2)(C) (lineal descendants are "members of the family").
Id. 5 2032A(a)(lXA). A similar preclusion from bmefits would occur under 5 6166

As in Hypothetical 7, assume that no valuation diswunts are applicable.
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other voting stock and all stock has the same voting rights. Of the 49 shareholders other
than Dora Ewing, one is her father, William Ewing; one is her brother, James Ewing; one
is her son, William Lucas; one is her daughter, Nell Lucas; and the other is MI. 2,Dora
Ewing's long-termcornpanion. The other44 shareholders are notrelated to Dora Ewing
many way.

As in Hypothetical 7 above, Company Y is not aclosely held corporationwith
respect to Dora Ewing based solely on her individual holdings; she personally
owns only two percent (or 1,000 out of 50,000) of the corporation's voting
shares. Furthermore, Dora Ewing's interest in Company Y does not qualify
as an "interest in aclosely held business" because Company Y does not have
fewer than 45 shareh01ders.z~~It is true that under $ 6166(b)(2)@), Dora
Ewing's stockownership is aggregated with that of her brother, James Ewing;
her father, William Ewing, her son, William Lucas; and her daughter, Nell
Lu~as.2~'
Her ownership is not aggregated with Mr. Z's, though, because he
is not a "member" of her "family" under $ 6166 (regardless of whether the
couple entered into and registered their domestic pattnership under New
Jersey law, for example)?35Company Y therefore is deemed to have 46 total
shareholders(i.e., Dora Ewing,Mr. Z and theother 44 individuals who are not
related to her in any way) and her estate will be ineligible for the deferred
payment provisions of 8 6166;216 This is true even though Dora Ewing and
Mr. Z are in a long-term committed relationship with characteristics similar
to marriage. Had they been married, their ownership would have been
aggregated and Dora Ewing's estate would have qualified for the extension
under $ 6166.z3' The estate tax law fails to incorporate the attention of family
law and gender scholarship to the associationalrelationshipsthat some people
call "families."
C. Tar Rules and Market Participation

An additional insight of recent family law scholarship is the way in which
women's caretaking activities frequently lead women themselves to become
de~endent.2~~
According tothis theory of "derivative dependency,"239because
233. I.R.C.8 6166(b)(l)(C)(ii).
234. Id. 5 6166(b)(2)(D).
235. Id.
236. Id. $6166(a).
237. Id. 5 6166(b)(Z)(D).
238. Fineman, Crackingthe Foundational Myths, supra note 193, at 2l;see also SuzannaDanuta
Waiters, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Commenrr on Martha Finemon's FoundotionalMyths, 8 AM. U .
J. GENDER SOC.POL'Y & L. 205,214 (2000) (~TiticizingFinernan'swork as falling "far short of the kind
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women have primary responsibility for the care of small children and the
elderly, they are unable to participate to the same extent as men in wageearning activities and thus become "dependent on the resources necessary for
that care."240
Insofar as the estate tax laws reward market-based activities, such as
participation in a family business:" they accord certain benefits to wageearning behavior that are not bestowed on caretaking activities. Yet if the
estate tax laws reward market behavior, that is also because the fruits of
market labor (i.e., "qualified real property"242or a closely held business
interest243)are subject to estate taxati0n.2~~
Caretaking activities, in contrast,
do not produce any assets that will be subject to estate taxation:45 and the
estate tax's failure to provide any benefit for them does not disadvantage the
caretaker. The caretaker-taxpayer is in no worse a position than one who
engages in qualifying market a~tivities.2"~
IV. FAMILY
UNITY:PROPOSALS
TO RESOLVE
THE ESTATE
TAX'S
CONFLICTING
DEFINITIONS
OF FAMILY
Given the complex and incomplete estate tax definitions of .family, it is
worthwhile to consider the possibility of reform. This Part N evaluates five
possible approaches to the problem of the conflicting meanings of family in
estate tax law. First, this Part considers the adoption of a unifonn'defmition
of radical restructuring that needs to take place.").
239. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 193, at 20.

-.

760
-. Id

-. .

241. See LR.C. 66
use is "use as a Etrm for farmine oummes" or "use in a
".2032A(b)a)
, ,. . foualified
,.
irdeorbusinessotherthan the trade orbusiness offarming"); 6166(b)(l)(A)-(C)(only pamership interest
orstockinacorporation is countedindeterminationofestate'seligibility forextensionoftime topayestate
taxes).
242. See id. 4 2032A(a)(l), @)(I).
243. See id. 4 6166(a), (b)(l).
244. Cf id. 66 2001 (estate tax im~csedon the taxable estate of e m dcedentwho is a citizen or
resident of theunited state), 2051 (taxable estate means gmss estate minus ;emin deductions), 203 1 (the
orooertv.
value of the mass
. esiate includes the value at the time of the decedent's death of all .
. . real or
personal, tangtblc or intangible, wherever siruatrd). Sribon 2053 permit, deductions 1.21 cxpcnscs,
indcbrednesssnd rase Smtlon 20SJpcrmw adcdunlon ia1osc.s. Secltan 2055 oru\,idesiadeducoons
for charitable bequest$ legacies, devises or transfers. Section 2056(a) provides for a marital deduction for
"the value of any interest in .
prwewwhich
passes or has passed &om the decedent to his or her suwivine
- .
spouse, but only to the extmt such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate."
245. Id. $8 2051,2031.
246. See wpro notrs242-43. For an interesting dlscurs~onofiherolr. aflau in uurnen'r racialand
polttical advancement, see D u r n Rosmblurn, Pon4,Dispartry The Polit~colReprerenrurion ofGender
on the Tightrope ofliherol Conslihrfio~fa/
Tmdifiorrs,39 DAVISL. REV. 1119 (f006).
~

~
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of family for estate tax purposes. Second, this Part contemplates the complete
elimination of estate tax rules thatpenalize taxpayers or awardpreferences to
them based on family relationships. Third, this Part evaluates the desirability
of eliminating only the family-based preference rules. Fourth, this Part
explores increasing the estate tax exemption in order to reduce the number of
taxpayers who must navigate the complex definitions of family. Fifth, this
Part suggests revising the language used in the statutes in order to achieve
integrity in their interpretation and application.

A. Adopt a Uniform Definition of Family
Minimizing complexity in the tax law by adopting a uniform definition
has a recent precedent. In 2004, the 108th Congress enacted a uniform
definition of "child" for certain income tax purposes.247A similar uniform
approach to defining "family" in estate tax law would have at least the
perception of simplicity. A seemingly unlimited number of uniform
definitions could be offered, but this subpart considers the results under two
alternate scenarios: (1) the adoption of a "narrow" definition of "related"
persons modeled on the definition made applicable to 5 2036(a)(1) by
9 2036@)(2) (i.e., a taxpayer's spouse,children,g~andchildrenandparents);~~~
and (2) the adoption of a "broad" definition of family modeled on the
definition contained in 9 2032A (i.e., a taxpayer's ancestors, spouse, any
lineal descendant of the taxpayer, a linealdescendantofthe taxpayer's spouse,
any descendant of the taxpayer's parents and the spouse of any lineal
descendant of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any descendant of the
This subpart evaluates the advantages and
taxpayer's parent^).''^
disadvantages of each proposal.

247. Working FamiliesTax RelidAct af2004, Pub. L. No. 10&311,§ 201,118 Stat. 1166,1169.
Theuniformdefioitionofchild applies for purposes of 5 2(b) (definitionofhead ofhwsehold), 4 21 (credit
for expensesfor dependent care), $24(ehildtar credit), $ 32 (earned income credit) and $151 (exemption
for devendents). To sualifv
. . as a "child" under the uniform definition. the child must satisfi three
~cquircmcnti:''(1, [rlesid~ncy(the child has the same princtpsl place of abode 3s th~.taxpqcr tbr morr
than halfthe t ; u .)ear).
ic the wmaver's ron.&uehtcr.steo-child.brother.
. (2)
. . Rzlattonrh~~
. (Iherhtld
.
.
- . .
.sister..
step-sibling, or a descendant ofany such individual). (3) Age (generally, the child must be under age 19,
or24 ifa full-timestudent)." Congress Enacts the WorkingFamilies TarReiiefActof2004,101 J. TAX'N
195 (2004); see oiso Stephen Winn, Longing for Simpiiciry: Loopholes Complicate the Work of the
AverageTrpoyer,K~xsasC~TYSTAR,Mar. 23,2005, atB7; Jill Hammoo, TaxPlonningNeverEndrfir
Profesdonais, INDLANAPOL~S
STAR,Mar. 14.2005, at COI; Mike Ereeman,New Laws CouldLower Your
Tar Bill, SANDIEGOUNION-Tm.,
Feb. 6,2005, at H-2.
248 Tee wpra nore 27 and areompanymgtext
249 See supru note, 73-77 and scrompanyng te,e

..
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I . Adopt I.R.C. § 2036@)(2)'s Narrow Dejnition
Consider the consequences of an across-the-board adoption ofthe narrow
definition of "related" persons made applicable to 5 2036(a)(l) by
4 2036(b)(2). Such a restrictive approach to family is not exclusively progovernment or pro-taxpayer and might result in the under-taxation of some
transactions and over-taxation of others, using congressional intent and
existing levels of taxation as a referent.
a. Impact on Estate Tax Inclusion

In the case of the estate tax inclusion rule of 8 2036(a)(2), if the universe
of potentially "related and subordinate" persons were limited to a taxpayer's
spouse, children, grandchildren and parents,zS0it would become too easy for
the taxpayer to retain control over transferred property but still escape
taxation. In particular, a taxpayer could create a trust and retain an unlimited
power to remove and replace the trustee with a new trustee from a class that
includes the taxpayer's ~ibling.~''Because a sibling would not be a member
of the "family" under a narrow definiti~n,~'~
he or she would be treated as a
stranger (in a tax sense) to the taxpayer, and there would be no adverse
consequences to the taxpayer's retained right to remove and replace. The
taxpayer thus could retain effective control over the transferred property, even
though this control is precisely the type that Congress believed should trigger
inclusion under 5 2036(a)(2).253Too many transfers would escape taxation,
and so a narrow uniform definition of family wonld result in the systematic
under-taxation of transactions under 5 2036(a)(2).
b. Impact on Estate Tax Valuation and Payment
A narrow definition not only would cause under-taxation under

4 2036(a)(2), but also would cause over-taxation under $$2032A and 6166.
For these latter two sections, a narrow definition of family would mean a
smaller group of persons whose ownership and business activitiescould inure
250. I.R.C. 8 318(a)(l)(A) (incorporated by reference into $ 2036@)(2)'s definition of cant~olled
corporation).
251. See supra note 36.
252. See supra note 27 and accompanyingtext.
253. See supra Part U.A.
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to the benefit of the taxpayer. For example, consider again Hypothetical 5.
In that case, Dora Ewing's failure to participate personally in the business is
no obstacle to the application of § 2032A to her estate because the
participation of her brother, James Ewing, redounds to Dora Ewing's
benefit.'$' Contmst the results under a narrow definition of family. Under a
narrow definition, James Ewing would not be a "member" of Dora Ewing's
"family,'n55 and so Greenacre would fail the test for "qualified real
pr~perty.'"~~
It then would be ineligible for the special valuation rule under
$ 2032A.257 By narrowly defining the "family" as a taxpayer's spouse,
children, grandchildren and parents:$' fewer estates would qualify for the
special valuation rules of $ 2032A, resulting in greater incidence of taxation
than under current
Similarto its impact on the availability of $ 2032A, the narrow definition
of family would cause greater incidence of taxation under $ 6166. The fewer
people whose ownership may be attributed to the taxpayer, the fewer estates
will qualify for the extension of time in which to pay taxes. Although 5 6 166
admittedly would be affected less than $ 2032A (because of $ 6 1 6 6 ' ~greater
definitional similarities to "related" parties under $) 2036(b)(2)),260adopting
a narrow definition of family likely would result in a similar increase in the
incidence of taxation compared to current law.261
From both the government's and taxpayers' perspectives, the universal
adoption of the narrow definition of "related" persons made applicable to
$ 2036(a)(1) by $ 2036(b)(2) would have mixed benefits. The government
would be distressed (and taxpayers pleased) that fewer transactions would be
taxed under $ 2036(a)(2):62 but the government would be pleased (and
taxpayers distressed)by fewer estates qualifyingforthe special valuation rules

254. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 63-67 and accomoann'ne
. . "text.
258. See stgrn notr 27 and accompanying text.
~
armmcs current lcvels of taxation as the bascllne measure. u~thuutn a m r i v e
259. 1 %analpis
judgment about fie apprapriate level of taxation.
260. Seeinfra Appendix. The only difference betweentheproposednmowdefimtim of familyand
8 6166 is that the narrow definition d o a not include siblings whseas 8 6166 does. LR.C.
$5 6166(b)QKD), 267(cX4). Siblings arcnot membersof the family far purposes o f $ 2036(a)(1). Cf id.
$8 2036(a)(i), 2036@)(2),318(a)(l)(A).
261. Cf I.R.C. $8 6166@)(l)(B), (2)(D).
262. See supra Part IA.2.
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of 9 2032A2" and extensions of time to pay estate taxes under 5 6166?64For
these reasons, implementing a narrow uniform definition of family likely
would gamer little support fkom either constituency. Furthermore, a narrow
definition of family would not effectuate legislative intent. Congress was
concernedabouttaxpayers whosought to evade estate taxation while retaining
and a narrow defmitionof "fami1y"as the
control overtran~ferredproperty?~~
spouse, children,grandchildren and parents would create opportunities for the
very type of strategic behavior that Congress sought to minimize. Similarly,
a narrow definition of family for purposes of $5 2032A and 6166 would
preclude tax relief for the very types of estates that Congress intended to
benefit?66 As a policy matter, adoption of a narrow definition would he
inconsistent with legislative purpose.
2. Adopt I.R.C. j2032A's Broad Definition

If adoption of a uniformnarrow definition of family would be unpopular
or undesirable %om a policy perspective, it is instructive to consider the
opposite-adopting a broad definition of family. Of all the Code sections,
5 2032A takes the broadest approach267by defining the family asa taxpayer's
ancestors, spouse, any lineal descendant of the taxpayer, a lineal descendant
of the taxpayer's spouse, any descendant of the taxpayer's parents and the
spouse of any lineal descendant of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse or any
descendant of the taxpayer's pa~ents.2~'
Not surprisingly, though, universal
adoption of this broad definition of family would cause a pattern of both
under-taxation and over-taxation.
a. Impact on Estate Tar Inclusion

Adopting 5 2032A's broad definition as the uniform estate tax definition
of family would cause more transactions to be taxed under 5 2036 than are
currently. A broad definition also would tax more transactions than are
necessary in order to address lawmakers' concerns about taxpayer control over
transferred assets. Consider another hypothetical.

263. See supra Part LB.
264. See supra Part LC.
265. Seesupra Part U.A.
266. See supra Part II.B, C .
267. See supro Part I.D.
268. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying told
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Hypothetical 11. Assume the same facts as in Hypothetical 1, except that Dora Ewing
owns 5% of Company Y's totaloutstanding stock. DoraEwing again transfers toFriend
Frankher underlying equity interest in all of her Company Y stock Dora Ewing retains
the right to vote the shares. At the time of Dora Ewing's death, her sister-in-law, Mary
Mack, owns 95% of the Company Y stock.

Under 9 2036(b)(2)'s existing definition of a controlled corporation, Mary
and so Dora Ewing's five
Mack is not a member of Dora Ewing's famil~,2'~
percent ownership is not aggregated for estate tax purposeswith Mary Mack's
95%?70 Under current law, the Company Y stock is not included in Dora
Ewing's e~tate.2~'If 8 2032A's broad definition of family were adopted,
however, Mary Mack wouldbe considered amember of Dora Ewing's family
under the new definition?" The constructive ownership rules thus would
cause Mrs. Ewing to be the deemed owner of 100%of Company Y's stockand
it wouldbe a controlledcorporation with respect to her?73As in Hypothetical
1, then, the full value of the stock transferred to Friend Frank would be
included in Dora Ewing's gross estate under 5 2036(a)(1).?74 This is
inappropriate because, in fact, in a small business owned 5% by a taxpayer
and 95% by her sister-in-law, the shareholders likely will have different
economic i~terests?'~
Similar to the result under 9 2036(a)(1), adoption of 8 2032A's broad
definition of family would cause more transfers to be included in a taxpayer's
gross estate under $ 2036(a)(2) than are presently included. By way of
illustration, under current law, a taxpayer's cousin is not "related" to the
taxpayer for purposes of 4 672(c) and 9 2036(a)(2)?76 Thus, without adverse
tax consequences, a taxpayer can retain the unrestricted right to remove a
trustee who has discretionary authority to make distributions from the trust
and replace the trustee with his or her cousin, for example.?" If a broad
269. I.R.C. 5 318(a)(l)(A) (incorporated by ref~enceinto 5 2036@)(2)'s definition of controlled
corporation).
270. See id. 5 2036(b)(2).
271. Id. B 2036(a)(l), (b)(2).
272. See id 5 2032A(a)(l)(A).
273. Id. 5 2036@)(2).
274. Id. 5 2036(b)(1),(2).
275. Jensen,supranote19,at201~[Clonflictamongsiblingsiscanmon.");seealsoKeanethKaye,
Penetrating the CycleofSustainedC~nfricf,
Bus. HonxzoNs, Spring 1991,reprintedin FAMILYBUSINESS
SOURCEBOOK
0: 355,369-70 (Craig E. Aronoff ct al. eds., 1996).
276. See 1.R.C. 5 672(c)(l).
277. See, e.g., Estate of Fmel v. United State&553 F.2d 637 (Ct. C1. 1977); cf. Estate of Walt v.
Comm'r, 101 T.C. 300f1993).
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definition of family were adopted, however, a taxpayer's cousin would be
defmed as "related" to the taxpayer, and any ability to remove and replace
with the cousin-trustee would trigger estate tax inclusion under
5 2036(a)(2).278The overall impact of the adoption of a broad definition of
family would be the inclusion of more transfers in the gross estate than under
current law. Although Congress was concerned with the ability of taxpayers
to retain control over transferred assets through a trustee who functions, in
effect, as the transferor's al~er-ego:'~ Congress did not intend to implement
a per se rule against a trustee who is related to the transferor within any
degree of consanguinity. Such a broad definition of family is inconsistent
with legislative intent.
b. Impact on Estate Tax Payment

If the 8 2032A definition of family were adopted for all estate tax
purposes, more transfers would be included in the gross estate than are
o
become easier to qualify for an extension
currently included, but it ~ l s would
of time to pay estate taxes under 6 6166. Consider this variation on
Hypothetical 7.
HmatheKcai 12. Assume the same facts as in Hveothetical7. above. exceDt that of the
46ahareholden other than Dora Ewing, one isi;= stepson,~oger'~ucas;one is her
steoson'swife. Abbv Ga1e:one is her ne~hew.
.John Ewine:one isl~crsister-&-law.Maw
~ L c k and
; one is ier daughterin-law, Gloe Cox. 'Iheother 44 shareholders are nit
related to Dora Ewing in any way.

.

As in Hypothetical 7, in this hypothetical, the holdings of Dora Ewing alone
do not rise to the level that would make CompanyY a closely held corporation
with respect to her.'*' It is closely held, however, if it has 45 or fewer
~hrueholders,2~'
with the taxpayer's holdings being aggregated with the
holdings of members of his or her family.282If 5 2032A's uniform definition
applies, then Dora Ewing is deemed to own the shares held by her stepson,
Roger Lucas; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her nephew, John Ewing; her

278. See supra note 35.
279. See supra Pm lI.A
280. ~ e e 1 . ~ ~ . $ 6 1 6 6 @ ) ( l ) ( ~ ) ( l ) ( d e c e d e n t ~ s s ~ d
business interest for pumoses of 8 6166(a)(I)if decedent's moss estate includesrwenwuercentor more of
the value ofthe voting sfock of tfte corporation).
281. Id. $ 6166@)(lXC)(ii).
282. Id. 5 6166@)(2)(D).
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sister-in-law,Mary Mack; andher daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox. Thus Company
Y would be deemed to bave 45 total shareholders (i.e., Dora Ewing and the 44
individuals who are not "related" to her). Company Y therefore would be a
closely held business with respect to Dora Ewing within the meaning of
8 6166(b)(l)(C)(ii)zs3and Dora Ewing's estate would be eligible for the
deferred payment provisions of $ 6166.
Hypothetical 12 raises the question of whether adoption of a uniform
definition of family based on 2032A would make it too easy to qualify for
the extension of time to pay estate taxes under 4 6166. The extension was
developed for those estates that might have liquidity problems because of the
unique nature of family-owned businesses.2s4 But the shareholders in
Hypothetical 12 are related to each other distantly or by marriage only and
perhaps do not need the same amount of time to pay taxes that is needed by
the owner of businesses like the ones legislators had in mind when enacting
5 2032A.285A business that is owned by a taxpayer; her stepson, Roger
Lucas; her stepson's wife, Abby Gale; her nephew, John Ewing; her sister-inlaw, Mary Mack; her daughter-in-law, Gloe Cox; and 44 unrelated people
likely does not have the same characteristics as the classic family farm or
small family business. For that reason adopting a broad definition of family
wouldresult in taxpayers such as Dora Ewing in Hypothetical 12 receiving an
extension of time to pay taxes when they do not need extra time to pay.
B. Eliminate All Family-Based Preferences and Penalties

Instead of adoptingauniformdefinitionof family for estate tax purposes,
another response to the many conflictingestate tax definitionsof family would
be eliminating all estate tax preferences and penalties that depend on family
relationship^.'^^ Such elimination is not desirable, however, because it would
lead to both abusive behavior by taxpayers seeking to evade taxation and
financial hardship for many estates.
To illustrate the consequences of eliminating all estate tax preferences
and penalties for families, consider again Hypothetical 2. In that case, Dora
Ewing's ownership of Company Y stockcauses the full value ofthe Company

283. See id. 8 6166(b)(l)(C)(ii).
284. See supra Part U.C.
285. Seesupra Pan U.B.
286. Somethingsimilarwas suggested in aqufffionbyProfessmDarleneKennedyin response roan
earlier version of this paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Assodation, Las
Vegas, Nevada on June 4,2005.
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Y stock to be included in her gross estate.287 This is because under the
constructive ownership rules of 8 318, she owns her father's 95% interest,
making Company Y a controlled corporation with respect to her?" If,
however, "family" were made irrelevant for purposes of 5 2036@)(2), then
Dora Ewing's father's stock ownership would not be attributed to her:"
Company Y would not be a controlled corporation with respect to her and the
value of the transferred shares of Company Y stockwouldnot be included in
her gross estate?"
A uniformly broad definition of family also creates opportunities for
abusive transactions under 5 2036(a)(2). Undercurrent law, assets transferred
by a taxpayer will be included in the taxpayer's gross estate where he or she
retains the power to remove a trustee and replace him or her with a person
who is related or subordinate to the taxpayer within the meaning of
5 672(c).Z9' If the prohibition on the removal and replacement of "related"
trustees were eliminated, however, a taxpayer could appoint, remove and
replace as trustee his or her spouse or child, among others, without any
negative tax con~equences.2'~Nothing would prevent the taxpayer from
treating the trust as a will substitute (or worse, an alter ego), thus eroding the
purpose of the estate tax law which aims to include in the taxpayer's gross
estate transfers that are testamentary in nat~re.2'~
If all preferences for families were eliminated in the estate tax law, there
would be no special valuation of real estate under 5 2032:'" which in turn
would cause real property to be valued at higher levels than under current
law.295 Similarly, with no extensions of time to pay estate taxes under
5 6166y6 family-business owners might have to liquidate the business in
order to pay in a timely fashion any estate tax owed.297Congressional intent

287. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying teat.
288. I.R.C. 5 2036(b); see supra notes 29-3 1 and aocompan$ng to*.
289. See I.R.C. $ 2036(b).
290. See id. $2036(a)(l), @)(2).
291. See id. $ 672(c)(1).
292. See id. 8 2036(a)(2).
293. See,e.g., id. $$2035-2038;see also Willbanks,supra,note 18, at 5 (''Once it decided toretain
the fedaal state tax, Conrecognized the possibilities of tax avoidance through inter vivos gi& and
adopted a gift tax in 1924.").
294. See supra Part LB.
295. See supra note 58.
296. See supra Pan LC.
297. See I.R.C. 5 6075(a) (due date for payment of estate taxes ordinarily is nine montbs afler
decedent's death); see also supra note 105.
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to "solve the handicaps of new and small businesses" would be t h ~ a r t e 8 if
~'
farmers and small business owners had fewer estate tax benefits.
C. Eliminate the Family-Based Preferences

As an alternative to eliminating all family-based preferences and
penalties, it may be appropriate to consider eliminating only the preferential
rules, in light of the purposes of $5 2036,2032A and 6166 and contemporary
experiences of the family. Of the three Code sections, 5 2036 is unique in its
concern about taxpayers who seek to evade estate taxation through'transfers
of assets over which they (or their surrogates) maintain control.z99Section
2036 uses concepts of family and "related" taxpayers in order to facilitate
efficient application ofthe law. Otherwise, there wouldneed to he a case-hycase inquiry into every transfer of property over which the decedent retains
voting rights or unrestricted rights to remove or replace a trustee. The
and "related or s~bordinate"'~'
definitions of "controlled corp~ration'"~~
supply predictable bright line tests that allow taxpayers to determine ex ante
what arrangements will trigger estate tax inclusion under $2036.
In contrast to $ 2036's concern with control, both 5 2032A and 9 6166
bestow benefits on certain taxpayers-small business owners-who are
engaged in business activities that Congress has labeled as more
Given the purposes of each of $5 2032A and 6166, however, it is perhaps
inappropriate to limit the estate tax benefits to family transfers (in the case of
$2032A)30brapply favorable mles to families that do not apply to unrelated
taxpayers (in the case of $ 6166's methodology for determining the number
of owners of a business).304After all, the estate of a small business owner
faces the same liquidity concemsregardless ofwhether the decedent transfers
real property used in the business to a family member (and "qualified heir")'o5
or to a long-term (but unrelated) business partner. Similarlya business owned
by a group of, say, 50 unrelated taxpayers may function in fact more like a
closely-held business than one owned by a taxpayer, his or her six children

298. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
299. See supra P& 1I.A.
300. See supra note 23 and accompanyingtext.
301. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Part II.BC.
303. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes69-77 and accompanying text.
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and 44 grandchildren, although the latter would qualify as a closely-held
business under current law and the former would not.)06
Section 2032A's and 9 6166's reliance on family-based tests seems
especially inappropriate given the changing nature of the American
The definitions of family are under-inclusive and, as Hypothetical 9
illustrates, otherwise qualifying estates may be ineligible for benefits solely
because of a lack of formalized marital relationship between taxpayers, for
example. Lawmakers could consider two possible solutions to thisproblern:
either adopt a case-by-case analysis that could accommodate nontraditional
family arrangements or eIiminate the family-based benefits under $8 2032A
and 6166. The first of these alternatives, a case-by-case analysis, would be
cumbersome and unpredictable. Taxpayers would be unable to forecast with
certainty whether a particular relationship would be determined to be
sufficiently "family-like" to make certain transfers eligible for favorable
treatment under 8 2032A or 8 6166. The second alternative, eliminating the
family-based benefits under these Code sections, would be politically
unfeasible, given the importance of the small business owner and family
farmer in congressional rhet~ric.)~' Taxpayers would hardly welcome
elimination of the special valuation rules and extension of time to pay taxes.

D. Increase the Estate Tax Exemption
As an alternative to estate tax repeal, congressional leaders are discussing
the possibility of increasing the estate tax exemption to an amount from $1.5
million to between $8 million and $10 million per t a ~ ~ a y e r . ~the
~Vf
306. Seesupra Part LC.2,
307. See s u ~ r aPart IflB.
308. See su& Part II.BE.
309. Brodv Mullins. Senators Discuss Comromise Bill For the Estofe Tax, WALLST. J., Apr. 8,
2005, at B2. Such an approach is similar to the system pmposed in Crawford, s u p note 56. Professor
Michael Graetz of Yale Law School has proposed a per-person estate tax exemption of $5 million, or$lO
million for married couples. See David Cay Johnston, Few Wealthy Formers Owe Estate Taxes,Report
Saw.
, . N.Y. TIMES.July 10.2005. at A21 (describing
- views of Professor Graetz). Forcornmentaryon the
economic lmpl~cationsof the proposal to raise the exemption to 58 million per person, sce Joel Friedrnnn
& RuthCarlitz.Kylt'slore Tar ' C o n ~ p t . r u r n i s e " P ~ ~ l E r f r e m e(2005),
~ C o ~ http.
~ / ~ w w . c b p p . a ~77-05lax pdf,seeolro Dustin Stampcr,Boucrcr.KylAgr~eonF~totr
TL? 'Po,omrlerr,' 1 0 8 T , ~ x N o263.
~t~
263 t2005)tdcsc"btn~
brween Senator JohnKyl R-Ariz.,andSenalor Wax Baurus. D.Mont.,
.
- serrnnrnt
to design estate tax reform bill hat reains extension of time to pay estate taxes, inter alia, while raising
exemption amount and lowering maximum tax rate). A recent version of the proposal includes a $3.5
million exemption and a top mtate tax rate of fitloen percent. Editorial, The Stnfe of the Estde Tar, N.Y.
TIMES,Aug. 8,2005, at A14. A New York Times editorial criticizes a $3.5 million exemption as "overly
generous,"and suggeststhat "a $2 million exemption would beample toprotect the hard-working familie,

.
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exemption were so increased, far fewer taxpayers would be forcedto navigate
the complex and conflicting estate tax definitions of family. By way of
illustration, in 2002,98,359 estate tax returns were filed, but only 1.9% of
those were for gross estates valued at $10 million or more? ' W f that 1.9%,
a full one-third of the returns were for nontaxable estates?" The other twothirds contributed more than 36% of the total estate tax revenue for 2002."2
Presumably estates of the relatively few ultra-wealthy taxpayers can afford
sophisticated tax advice and interpretingthe conflicting estate tax definitions
of family is not a significant burden.)"
Even though fewer estates would be subject to the complexities of the
estate tax if the exemption were raised to $10 million, three important
concerns would remain. First, the concept of horizontal equity in taxation
demands that "similarly situated individuals should be taxed similarly."'14 If
the tax law is too complicated, only those who seek (and receive) quality tax
advice will have lower tax bill^.''^ Insofar as all taxpayers have the equal
opportunity to seek advice, there is no violation of the principle of horizontal
equity. But the only people who benefit &om such a systemare the advicegiving lawyers and accountants-not taxpayers. Second, the cost of
complying with and enforcing the law would remain extremely high?I6 In

entrepreneursand farmersthatestatetax fces claim to care about most." Id. TheNov York Timeseditorial
also supwm
~. a hiaha top rate, explaining that a hider rate would 'keep the tax faii' whereas "a fifteen
percent tar rat? would transhte to a mnerix percent levy on a $20 m~llioncstatc." Id.
3 10. SlatistlcsoflncmeDivlsion. lntemd Revenue Srrv, EstateTax Rerums Filed in2002 (?004).
hrv. www.irs.govluxsta1dindta~~tats/arti~I~O,,id2,OO.html.
31 I The rcst likely. qual.fied for the charitable or mariul dcdurtion. See id.
312. See id.
3 13. For a general example ofthesophisticated level of legal advice thata wealthy decedent'sestate
Can afford, see JONATHAN0. BLATTMACHR,
THECOMPLETE
GUIDE TO WEALTH
PRESERVATION AND
ESTATBPLANNINO
(2000).
3 14. Willbanks, mpro note 18, at 9. On the role of harizonul equity in laxation gennally, ,a
hllCll.\ELA. LIVLNGSTON,TAXATION
L A W , P L A N N U ~ G & P O L I C Y , ~ ~ X W(2003);~eeolsoChrist0phn
-XXXV~
T. Nixon, Should Congress Revise fke Tax Code to Extend the Some Tm Benefrls to Some-Sex ~ o ~ ~ l e r
as Are Currently Gmnted lo M m i e d Couples? An Analysb in Light ofHoriwnfal Equity, 23 S. ILL.U.
L.I. 41 (1998) (comparing tax treahnent of same-sex couples and opposite-sex married couples).
315. See James R. Repetti, Demooncy, Taxer, and Wealth,76N.Y.U.L. REV.825,868-69 (2001)
(complex Code provisions "createan equityproblembecausethqr providethe greatest benefitto thosewho
seek sophisticated tax advice. To the extent that the estate tax does impose an unacceptable burdar,
policymakersneed to identify the benefits provided by small businesses and family farmsand to deermine
the best way to target tax relief to those companies providing the benefits.").
316. ProfessorStephameWil1banharticulatesanim~tgoalofanytaxsystemas"adminish;ltive
feasibility," explaining thaf "[iJt should not impose significant costs for enforcemenf compliance or
planning. Other principle include: simplicity, stability, and direcmess, i.e., how visible is the taxto those
who pay it?' Willbanks,supro note 18, at 10.
~
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fact, the cost could even increase, if auditing more large estates required
greater commitment of governmental resources. Finally, the loss of estate tax
revenue would be ~ignificant.)'~
Raising the estate tax exemption, therefore,
may be a partial solution, but it is incomplete in at least three important ways.

E. Revise Terminology to Achieve Statuto~yIntegrity
1. Generally

Each of the proposals considered so far in this Part-adopting a uniform
definition of family, eliminating all preferences and penalties for families,
eliminating only the family-based preferences, and raising the estate tax
exemption-has significant flaws. No single defmition of family discussed
here would effectuate legislative intent:" and it is unlikely that any single
definition would be appropriate for all estate tax purposes, given the diverse
purposes for which the laws were enacted. Eliminatingall family-based estate
tax rules likely would result in systematic over-taxation or under-taxation,
using legislative intent and existing levels of taxation as a reference. One
variation on this proposal, eliminating only the beneficial provisions of
$$ 2032A and 6166, would be politically unpopular, if not impossible to
implement. The option of raising the estate tax exemption would minimize
the number of taxpayers who would be subject to the conflicting meanings of
family in estate tax law, but such an increase would not eliminate the law's
complexity.
In light ofthese unsatisfactory options, thebest (and perhaps the simplest)
solution is revising the statutes to eliminate internal conflict over terms like
"family" and "related" persons and to reflect each Code section's unique
purposes. Within abody of law, words shouldbe usedconsistently and, to the
Statutory
extent possible, in ways that comport with lay under~tanding.~'~
integrity is a fundamental requirement for public confidence in the legal
system. As Ronald Dworkin observes,

317. See Friedman & Carlitz, suprn note 309. Over the ten year period, from 2012 to 2021, the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that raising the estate tax exemption to $8 million per
person would cost up to $700 million in lost revenue. Id.
3 18. See supra Parts El, IVA.
319. See supra note 7. Although this subpan outlines some of the most significant changes that
would need to be made in connection with the proposal to achieve statutory integrity, a comprehensive
legislative proposal is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Internally compromised statutes cannot he seen as flowing *om any single coherent
scheme of principle; o n the contrary, they serve the incompatible aim of a rulebook
c o n r r n u ~which
t ~ ~ is to ~ o m ~ r o m i s e ~ c o n v ~ c talong
i o n s lines of power. They conuadlct
rather than conlirm the commitment necessary to make a large and diverse poltrical
society a genuine rather than a bare c o m i & the promise &at law will bechosen,
changed, developed, and interpreted in an overall principled way."'

If it is not possible to use terms like "family" and "related" persons
consistently across Code sections, then it is appropriate to consider using
distinct terms for their unique and lirnitedpurposes. The proposedterms also
would more closely effectuate legislative intent.
2. Revisions to I.R C.$2036

In the case of $ 2036(a)(l), its estate tax inclusion mle does not contain
any reference to "family" and would not need to he revised. Instead the
revisions would need he made to the definition of "controlled corporation" of
$ 2036(b)(2) that is made applicable to 8 2036(a)(1). The definition of
"controlled corporation" could be revised to use a self-contained attribution
mle, instead of incorporating the attribution rule of $ 318 by reference. The
self-contained attribution rule could refer to members of the "Attribution
Group" instead of members ofthe decedent's "family.'"2' That way, it would

320. RoNALDDw~RKIN,LAw'~EMFIRE~I~(~~~~).
AlthoughStamtoryint~rityas~~edhererefem
to consistency in language and interpretation, WilliamEskridge and Philip Frickey emphasize Dworkin's
interest in moral consistency. William N. Eskridge, Jr. &Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U.PITT.L. REV. 691, 721-22 (1987). They cbim that
Dworkin would "rpluirell lawmakers to w tomake the total set of laws morally coherent. . 'Ihe courts'
role is to interpret a"tho&tive statemengof law (the Cmtimtion, statutes, c i m o n lawprecedents) in
light of the underlying principles of the communih: Thus, in the 'hard cases' of stamtorv internretation.
the best interpretation is the one that is most consonant with the underlying values of soiiery a i d makes
the statute the best statute it can be (within the limitations imposed by the language)." Id. (citations
omitted).
321. A newly-revised 5 2036(b)(2) might read as follws:
(2) Control!ed curporarion. For purposes of paragraph ( I ) , a corporation shall bs rrratcd as a
connoilcd cwpor-ation ii, 31 any ttme afrm the transfer of !he .
propmy
and duioe the thee-ydar
.
period ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent owned (with the application of
paragraph (3)),or had the tight (either alone w inconjunction with any other person) to vote, stack
possessing at least twenty percent of the total combined w i n g power of all clssses of stock.
(3)Attribution. An individual shall beconsideredas awningthe stackawoeddirectlyorindirectly,
by or for any member of the Attribution Group. The Attribution Group shall consist of the
individual's spouse (other thanaspouse who is legallyseparated fiDmtheindividual under a decree
of divorce or separatemaintenance), and the individual's children, grandchildren, and parents.
Further sections would need to beadded to provide for amibution to and frompaherships, estates, trusts,
and CorpOratio~,as well as the heatment of stock options as stock ownership for limited purposcs ofthe

..
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be plain that the language of $ 2036(b)(2) should not be read and was not
intended to harmonize with any other Code section.
Similarly,with respect toinclusion under $2036(a)(2),that section would
not need to be revised. Instead, the Service should withdraw Revenue Ruling
95-58:22 applicable to the interpretation of $ 2036(a)(2), and issue a new
ruling that prohibits removal of a trustee and replacement by a person who is
a member of the "Prohibited Class," for example, instead of a person who is
"related or ~ubordinate.'"~~
Alternately the Service could withdraw Revenue
Ruling 95-58 and add an example to the regulations under $ 2036, making
clear that a transferor-decedent risks estate tax inclusion where he or she
retains the right to remove a trustee and replace him or her with a member of
the Prohibited Cla~s?'~
As part of the statutory change of terms to "Attribution Group" and
"Prohibited Class," those terms could be drafted to include any person who is
defined for purposes of local law as a registered domestic partner or "spouse"
of the taxpayer?'' This would allow the estate tax inclusion rule to reach
transfers in the context of family-like relationships that presently are not
recognized as "family" for federal tax purposes. Including domestic partners
and state-law spouses within the $ 2036 definition would be consistent with
the legislature's concern over taxpayer control?26Furthermore, insofar as the
revised $2036 would apply only to domestic partnerships and mamages that
are recognized by the state, there should be little, if any, evidentiary concern
over who is a registered domestic partner or spouse for state law purposes.

5 2036(b)(3). Ses 1R.C g 318(3)(4) (penon w~thoption to acqulre sta'k is neated as mRnrng that
suck,. Thecurrent 6 2036(bi(3)(~~titled"caodinationwithsection 2035") wouldnwdto bercnumhred.
nc,,

322. Rev. ~ u i 95-58,
.
1995-2 CB. 191.
323. The Prohibited Class could be defined as the taxpayer's spouse, father, mother, issue, brother
or sistrr, an) employre oithe laxpaycr, any corpontion oremployeeufscorparation in which rhcholdiqs
of2 tn*pa,rr
inqucrt~on)"ares i ~ i f i r a n hum
t
the viewpoint of\ot~ngconrrd";and
. . lor the pm~culhrt111>1
"subordinate" employees of a corporation in which thc taxpayer is an executive. Seesupra notes 39-43.
324. To Treasuv Regulation 20.2036-I@), for example, there could be added the following new
paragraph: "(4) The phrase fight. to designate the pason m persons who shall possess or enjoy the
h-ansfened propmy or theincometherefrom' includes aresewed right toremove and replace a tzustee who
is a member of the Prohibited Class." The "Prohibited Class" would thm be defined as insupra note 323.
325. If the terms were dnfied brcadly, the ssond sentmce of the new 5 2036@)(3)would provide
that the Attribution Gmup "shall consist of the individual's spouse (other than a spouse who is legally
separated from the individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance), any person who is
registend as a domestic paimer under the state or local laws of the taxpayer's domicile, any penon who
is defined as the taxpayer's spouse for purposes of slate law, and the individual'schildlen, grandchildren,
and parents." The definitionof Prohibited Class would be expanded similarly.
326. See supra Part U.A.
~
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3. Revisions to I.RC. $2032A

Because it relies heavily on "family" as a defined term to implement its
substantive rule, $2032A would need more extensive revisions to achieve the
desired statutory integrity. Apart from the purely semantic change of
replacing "family" with a term such as "Qualified Heir Group," it would be
appropriate to consider expanding the definition's substance in light of
9 2032A's underlying policy goal of providing tax relief to the family farmer
or small business owner.)27 The "Qualified Heir Group" could be defined as
all of the persons who are included under existing law as members of a
taxpayer's "family"'28 as well as any other individual whose total real estate
and farm holdings are below a certain fair market value. That would allow a
decedent to leave real property to a long-time employee who, fox example,
spends 30 years working on the farm before the decedent's death, without
extending the special valuation rule in cases where a decedent's family
decides to sell the family farm to a large agribusiness conglomerate. As a
matter of practical politics, it is extremely unlikely that Congress would
expand the definition of "Qualified Heir Group" to include persons who are
registered as domestic partners or recognized as spouses for state law
purposes. From a policy perspective, however, renaming and expanding the
definition of a "qualified heir" to include domestic partners (as well as their
descendants) is consistent with the statute's desire to foster small farms and
business activities. There is no logical reason that the tax benefits should be
limited to transfers to relations by blood or federally-recognizedma1~iage.3~~

327. See supra Part U.B.
328. Forpurposes ofthe current 5 2032A, a taxpayer-decedent's "Family" consists of (A) anyof the
taxpayer's ancestors; (B) the taxpayet's spouse; (C) any lineal descendant of the taxpayer; (D) a lineal
descendant of the taxpayer's spouse; (E)any descendam of the taxpayer's
. .
.lrarents (i.e.. a taxnaver's
..
siblings, nieces and nephcur, etc.); and (F) any spouse of any lineal descendant of the raxpayn, t!lr
taxpayer's spuuseor any derrmdant afths taps)er's parsntr. Scr $?,pronates 72-77 and amompanyng
text
329. The tern 'Qualified Heir Gmup" would apply for purposesof the fiftypercent and twenty-five
percent threshold tests. See I.R.C. 5s 2032A@)(I)(B) (fifty percent test), 2032A(b)(l)(C) (twenty-he
percent test). For example, 3 2032A(bXI) could be revised as follows:
(b) Qualified real propew.(1) In general.-For purposes of this section, the term "qualified real property" means real
property locard ,n the Unwd Slates uhlch was acqu~redfrom or puscd from the decedent to a
member oftheQual~fiedHc!rGroupand wh~rh.onthe~fateofthedcccdent'idrath,uasbr.in~wed
for a qualified use by the decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir Group, but only if(A) fifty percent or more of the adjusted value of the decedent's g m s estate mnsists of the
adjusted value of real or personal property which(i) on the date of the decedent's death, was being used im a qualified use by the
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4. Revisions to I.RC. f 6166
As with $ 2032q the substantive meaning of $ 6166 derives in
substantial part from its definition of family, and so revising the definition
entails significant changes to the statute. As with 2036, the definition of
family is incorporated by reference to a separate Code se~tion:~%nd so
achieving the desired statutory integrity will require rewriting $ 6 166 to have
a self-contained attribution rule. In particular, 8 6166 might be rewritten to
attribute to a taxpayer the holdings of his or her "Closely Held Business
Associates" instead of his or her "family" as defined in $ 267(c)(4)."' The
Closely Held Business Associates could include all persons defined under the
current $6166 as a "member" of a decedent's "family."33z The term would be
applicable only for the limited purposes of $ 6166 and would not bear any
resemblance to terminology used in any other Code section. Again, though,
to the extent that Congress is concerned about the longevity of small
businesses, it may be theoretically appropriate, if politically unfeasible, to
include registered domestic partners and state-law spouses within that group.

decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir Gmup, and
(ii)
. was acauked from or oasses from the decedent to a member of the Oualified Heir
Group.
(B) twenty-five percent or more of the adjusted value of the gross estate consists of the
adjusted valueofreal propertywhich meets the requirements ofsubparagraphs(AXii)and(C),
(C) during the eight-year period ending on thedate of the decedent's death there have been
periods aggregating five years or more during which(i) such real property was owned by the decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir
Group and used for a qualified use by the decedent or a member of the Qualified Heir
Groua.
.. and
(ii) there was mterial participation by the decedent or a member of the Quatitied Heir
Grout, in the arremtion of the farm or other business. and
(D) such real &opew is designated in the agreement refened to in subsection (d)(2).
330. Seesupra note 125 and accompanying text.
331. Seesupra note 125 and accompanying text.
cunents 6166, thetaxpayer's"fam3y"is
definedbyreferenceto 5 267(c)(4)
332. Forpumosesofthe
~.
. .
as the taxpayn's sibl~ngs,9 p O U X . ancesiors, and lineal deccmdanrs See supra notes 125-27 and
accompanying ten. A rensed 6 6166(b1(2)(1>)n u b t rzad in pcninmt pan as follows:
-0)
certain interests hdd by others. 'All stock and all p&nership;nterests held by thedecedent
ot by any member of the Closely Held Business Associates shall be treated as owned by the
decedent.
(E) Closely Held Business Associates. The Closely Hdd Businas Associate with respect to
any individual shall include that individual's brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half
blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.

.
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Ultimately the estate tax law's account of "family" will need to be broadened
to include a greater range of the relationships that people call by that name.

Family is both a burden and a benefit for estate tax purposes. Family is
a burden to the extent that attribution rules trigger estate tax inclusion under
§ 2036(a)(l),j3' or if the ability to replace a removed trustee with a relative
runs afoul of the prohibition on the removal of related or subordinate parties
under 5 2036(a)(2).1)' Family is a benefit insofar as it may cause #special
valuation rules to be available under 6 2032A335or for an estate to have more
time to pay taxes under 5 6166.1" Each of these already intricate Code
sections is complicated by a unique defmition of "family" or "related"
persons. The definitions range from 5 2036(b)(2)'s narrow classification of
spouse, children, parents and grandparents as "related" for purposes of
$8 2036@)(2) and 2036(a)(l),"' to 5 2032A's broad grouping of ancestors,
descendants, step-children, siblings and spouses as members of the same
"family."33s
The variety in the estate tax definitions of family reflects, to some extent,
the diversity in the composition of contemporary American families. In a
society in which twocareer couples, divorce, remarriage and
multigenerational families are c0mmon,3~~
laws that seekto tax the transfer of
wealth necessarily will have a certain level of complexity. Recent family law
scholarship, with its emphasis on connectedness and interdependency,
provides a useful lens for examining the strengths and shortcomings of the
existingtax r ~ l e s . 3But
~ ~insofar as family law theorists criticize the relatively
low value accorded to women's caretaking activities, those theorists should
have little quarrel with the estate tax laws which do not tax the fruits of those
caretaking activities.
In response to the complexity of the estate tax rules, a uniform definition
of family could be adopted. The main problem with a single definition,
however, is the systematic over-taxation or under-taxation that likely would
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supra Part LA.1.
See supra Part IA.2.
Seesupra Part LB.
Seesupra Part IC.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
See s u p ~ aPart UI.
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re~ult.9~'Although only two specific uniform definitions are discussed in
detail in this Article, it is unlikely that any uniform definition would be
appropriate, given the diverse purposes for which $5 2036,2032A and 6166
were enacted The second proposal, the elimination of all family-based
preferences and penalties, is similarly inadequate. Such a change would lead
to abusive behavior by taxpayers or financial hardship for many estates. The
third proposal, eliminating only the family-based preferences, may be more
appropriate in light of the purposes for which the Code sections were enacted,
but this would be politically unpopular, and perhaps imp~acticable?~Vhe
fourth proposal, doing nothing in response to the conflicting meanings of
family, is a partial (if incomplete) solution. With the scheduled increases in
the estate tax
and perhaps even greater increases to come,'44
inconsistencies in the estate tax defmitions of terms like "family" and
"related" may become less important if they will apply to fewer estates?45For
the few estates to which the law would still apply, it is truethat there exists a
who
developedjurisprudence on what constitutes a controlled c~rporation:~~
is "related" to a taxpayer in a tax sense,'47when an estate is eligible for the
special valuation ofreal estate"8 and under what circumstances an estate may
receive extra time to pay its tax
Tax lawyers and other advisors are
generally familiar with these rules and can, with careful study, advise clients
on how to structure their affairs to minimize estate ta~es.9~'

341. Seesupro Part N.A.
342. See supra Pan 11.
343. Seesupra note 167.
344. See supra Part W.D.
345. Accading torecent Congressional Budget Officeestimates, had the cunent $19million estate
tax exemption been in effect in 2000, fewer than one percent of all estates (approximately 13,770) would
have been subject to any estate tax. Edmund L. Andrews, Death Tar? Double Ter.'For Most. ItS No
Tar, N.Y. TIMES, Au& 14,2005, at B4.
INCOME
TAXATION
OF
346. See, e.g., 1 BORISL BITTKER& JAMESS. EUSTICE,FEDERAL
CORPO~AT~ONSAND
SHAREHOLDERS
19.02 (7th ed. 2000); Ringe1,supra note 207,211-12; STEPHENS
ET
AL.,supra note 20, fl4.08[6][dJ.
347. See, e g , 9 JACOBMERTENSLAW
OF FEDERAL
INCOME
TAXATION
§ 3736 (Shane A. Ha* ed.,
2005) ("Granta Taxable Because of Power to Control Beneficial Enjoyment"); 47A C.J.S. Internal
Revenue $455 (2005).
348. See, e.g., Brockman v. Comm'r, 903 F.2d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1990) (definition ofWqualified
use"); Heffley v. Comm'r. 884 F.2d 279, 283-84 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Bmck v. United States, 86
U.S.T.C. U 13,692 (N.D. Ind 1986) (same); Estate of Abellv. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 696,699 (1984) (same):

note 20,7 4.04.
349. See, e.g., STEPHENS
ET AL.,supra note 20,B 2.02[31[cl.
350. As LeamedHandfamously remarked, "there is nothing sinister in so arranging ate's affairsas
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Yet in light of the significant conflict in the estate tax definitions of
family, doing nothing is an unacceptable solutioa Unless the statutes are
revised to achieve sane degree of integrity, they will continue to contribute
to the general public's sense that the tax laws are unfair and overly
c~mplex.'~' This Article proposes using terms like Attribution Group,
Qualified Heir Group and Closely Held Business Associates instead of terms
like "family" and "related" persons. Although the changes are semantic in
some sense, they embody the larger belief that statutes ought to use words
consistently and in ways that comport withlay understanding. This will also
align the definitions more closely with legislative intent. The rigorous
demands of statutory integrity require nothing less.

..

to keep taxes as low as possible. for nobody owes any public dutyto pay more than the law demands.''
Comm'r v. Nwman, 159 F.2d. 848,850-85 1 (1947) (Hand, C.J., dissenting). Advacates of maintaining
the status quo in the tax laws may point to the predictability in the tax laws @aao impoaant policy goal.
See 0klahonna Tax Cornrn'n v. khrckasaw ~ i t l o n .515 U.S. 450. 459 (1995)
adminirrn&an
rcquirr..i predictability."); seealso William M. Gentry & Helen F. Ladd.Srore Tax Slrucrurrond.Ilu/~,o/e
Policy Objectives, 47 NAT'LTAX
J. 747,747 (1994) (predictabilityis important in tax policy). Clarity and
stanttory integrity would seem to be more pressing policy goals in this case, however.
351. McLaughlin&Assac., Vo1crs21oISayEsrnleTaxis "Unfair"-EvenForBiIIion(1ires(2001),

ax

hnp:llwww.mclaughlinonlinee~om/newspolVnp2OOllOlO525~t.h~.
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p o l . 3:l

APPENDIX
Who Is a Member of the Family for Estate Tax Purposes?3s2

transferor
Any lineal descendant of the
transferor's spouse

No

No

Any spouse of any lineal
descendant of the transferor

No

No

Any spouse of any lineal
descendant of the
transferor's spouse

No

No

Yes

No

Any ancestor of the
transferor

YedS6

Yes357.

Yes

Yes

'

Yes

No

Yes

No

-

352. This chart does not include four categories of persons who potentially are "related or
subordinate" parties for purposes of $ 2036(a)(2) but who &e not otherwise considered "related" or
members ofthe "family" for purposes of the other Code sections. Those cataories are (a) an employee of
the grantorlhansferor; (b) a corporation in which the holdings of the @antor-and the m s t ares&nificant
fromthe viewpoint of voting control;(e) anemployeeof a corporation in which the holdmgs of the grantor
and the t m t are significant fmm the viewpoint of voting control; and (d) a subordinate employee of a
corporation in which the grantor is an executive. I.R.C. $5 2036(a)(2), 672(c).
353. The spouse is a member of the defined class unless the spause is legally separated fmm tbe
individual under a decree of divone or separate maintenance. Id. $5 2036(b)(2), 318(a)(l )(A)(&
354. To be a member of the defined class, the wnsferor's spouse must be living with the grantor.
Id. $9 2036(a)(2), 672(c).
355. A lineal descendant is a member of the defined class if he or she is a child or grandchild of the
transferor. Id. $§ 2036@)(2), 3 18(a)(l)(A)(ii).
356. An ancestor is a member of the defined class, if the ancestor is the mother a father of the
transferor. Id. $8 2036(b)(2), 318(a)(l)(A)(ii).
357. An ancestor is amember ofthe defined class, ifthe ancestor is the transferor's mother or father.
Id. $$2036(a)(2), 672(c).
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Any descendant of an

No

No

Yes

69

No

individual's sibling (nieces,
nephews, etc.)

358. The spouse of an ancestor of the transferor is not a member of the defined class, unless that
spouse is the hansferor's own mothaor father. Id. $00 2036(a)(2), 6721~).

